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The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) represent a unique subset of the 
Arab world, with many common cultural, political, and economic characteristics.  This research 
project is designed to assess the prospects for future democratization in these oil-rich 
monarchies.  Contrary to many other Arab States, these nations have several advantages that 
bode well for future liberalization, including small, highly educated populations and vast 
resources.  Several have young, progressive-minded rul rs who are competing against each other 
regionally to be more modern and prestigious and enjoy i creased influence.  Further, these 
rulers face tremendous pressure to create jobs and opportunity for their extremely young 
population.  Although most of the G.C.C. rulers will resist sharing power for as long as possible, 
there is every reason to believe that in order to survive they will have to allow greater political 
participation.  And because they enjoy substantial legitimacy among the people, this opening is 
more likely to result in greater democratization, not radical Islamist takeover.  To be fair, there is 
certainly a wide range of potential among these state : Oman and Saudi Arabia lag far behind 
their neighbors, while Kuwait and Qatar have gone farther than the others in increasing 
participation and accountability in their political systems.  There is good reason to be optimistic 
about the prospects for democratization over the long-term for the G.C.C., a fact which should 




The prospect of democratization among the Arab countries of the Middle East has long 
been a topic of particular interest for both policy-makers and political scientists.  For policy-
makers, especially recent American administrations, thi  interest has been based on the belief 
that a more liberal and free Middle East would be better for U.S. interests.  For many political 
scientists, the topic of interest has been the resistance of the region to the kinds of 
democratizations taking place in other parts of the world (Bellin 2004).  Most of the comparative 
work on political change and democratization has either ignored the region or dismissed it as 
hopeless (Nonneman 2001).  A great deal of the area studies work has been profiles of particular 
countries, with little general theorization.  This di connect has led to a kind of schism in the 
discipline, with scholars of democracy excluding the Middle East in their own theory-building, 
and with area studies experts largely ignoring theory in their case studies.  This separation has 
benefited neither side and is part of why there is still so much work to be done.   
Michael L. Ross addresses this problem implicitly by encouraging 
scholars who study democracy to incorporate the Middle East into their analyses.  
Many ‘global’ studies of democratization have avoided the Mideast entirely.  
Influential studies by Przeworski and Limongi and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, 
and Limongi simply drop the oil-rich Mideast states from their database.  There 
is, however, no sound analytical reason for scholars of democracy to exclude 
these states from their research, and doing so can only weaken any general 
findings.  It also tends to marginalize the field of Middle East studies (2001, p. 
328).  
 
This paper is designed to integrate the best of what the democratization literature has to 
offer with particular cases and insights derived from the Middle East.  Specifically, I will make a 
case for optimism: there is reason to believe that some Arab countries are likely to further 
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democratize in the coming decades.  The six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council1 represent 
the most likely source of this change, and provide a unique set of cases to examine.   
This argument is not without controversy, and many scholars take a different view.  
Many argue that hope is in short supply when it comes to prospects for change and improvement 
in Arab political systems.  A long history of disappointment and backsliding has conditioned a 
healthy skepticism in the political science and policy-making community.  A great deal of the 
disagreement among experts and scholars on this issue i  rooted in the different approaches, 
variables, and theories used to analyze the Arab World.  A key question is whether the region is 
suitable for comparison with other areas of the world.  I argue that although the Mideast is 
sufficiently different to warrant exploring other, unique ways of studying its particular path to 
democratization, it is also useful to consider its progress (or lack thereof) within the traditional 
theoretical frameworks.   
The key to this analysis will be in understanding the ways in which the Gulf monarchies 
are like each other and different from other Arab states.  Considering them as a special subset of 
countries in the region is already standard practice among many scholars for this reason.  These 
petro-monarchies have certain key features in common.  They are first, ruled by absolute 
monarchs and governed primarily by the royal family.  Second, they are (to greater or lesser 
degrees) dependent on oil production for their income.  Third, they have small populations, and 
even smaller numbers of full-fledged citizens.  Fourth, they are traditional in nature, with 
authority deriving from tribal culture and Islam.  And fifth, they are all members of a single 
alliance, the Gulf Cooperation Council.  Sulayman Khalaf notes that  
the dominant features that underpin Arab Gulf societies are as one societal type 
far outweigh those that create diversity.  To wit, they all share a similar climate 
and ecology, common history, language, demographic features, religion and 
                                                
1 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
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culture.  Moreover, they found themselves recently possessing huge oil reserves.  
The export of this treasure has brought about great prosperity, which in turn has 
generated similar transformations, development, and challenges. . . .In less than 
half a century, oil wealth brought somewhat uniformly broad transformations to 
the Arab Gulf’s entire way of life (2006, p.245). 
 
All of these commonalities suggest that the G.C.C. countries are highly comparable, apples and 
apples, in other words, as opposed to the oranges of the rest of the region.   
The path ahead for the Persian Gulf monarchies is neither preordained nor easily 
discernible.  The end result may not be something readily recognizable to most democratization 
scholars.  However, the argument to be made in this paper is that if democratization is likely to 
proceed anywhere in the Middle East, it will be in the G.C.C.; further, these countries are more 
likely to continue to reform, albeit slowly and gradually, rather than regress.  The Gulf States 
have generated considerable excitement among democracy-p omoters because of the 
increasingly important role that elections and parliaments play in these regimes (Stepan and 
Robertson 2003).  This is not to say that the process will be even or without setbacks; recent 
history cautions against such blind optimism.  Yet each of these countries is facing certain 
pressures and is armed with certain resources and options to deal with them.  The potential for 
further reform is there, as are substantial pressur that these regimes will be forced to confront 








Review of Relevant Literature 
 One of the most vexing puzzles for policy-makers and political scientists alike has been 
the lack of any real democracy in the Arab world.  Part of what makes the Middle East so 
unusual in this respect is that democratization and liberalization are increasing in every other 
area of the world.  According to both Freedom House and the Polity IV project, every region of 
the world has shown marked improvement in average lev ls of democracy except the Middle 
East (Weiffen 2004). 
This resistance to democratization has been characterized as a “democracy gap,” and 
scholars have offered numerous explanations for the egion’s authoritarian entrenchment (Stepan 
and Roberston 2003; Karatnycky 2002).  Some have focused on the commonality of Islam to all 
of these countries, positing that somehow the Islamic faith was incompatible with or detrimental 
to democracy (Sarsar 2000).  These theories pointed to the assumed authoritarian nature of Islam, 
the all-encompassing nature of the religion (providing guidance for all aspects of life) and lack of 
separation between the religious and the political (S rsar 2000; Karatnycky 2002).  Additionally, 
to the extent that Islam is seen as a force in the subjugation of women, it conflicts with the 
establishment of full human rights necessary for democracy (Fish 2002).  These arguments, 
which are rooted in the sort of cultural critique offered by Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of 
Civilizations,”  have been widely criticized and refuted by the majority of scholars (Huntington 
1993; Anderson 2006; Zakaria 2004). 
These counter-arguments focus one of the following--either that Islam is indeed 
compatible with democracy or that the trouble is not Islam but the Arab Islamic world.  Brigitte 
Weiffen has argued that it is only a certain interpr tation of Islam which has been useful in 
sustaining autocratic rule (2004).  Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao claim that there is a wide 
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variety of interpretation occurring within Islam, and that some of these interpretations even 
explicitly support democracy (2005).  Fareed Zakaria gues that searching the Koran for clues 
to Islam’s true nature is unhelpful because of all the inherent contradictions and historically-
grounded guidelines.  Rather, he makes the case that Islam actually has anti-authoritarian bent, 
citing the Prophet Mohammed’s command to disobey any ruler who asks you to violate the 
Muslim faith (2004).  He goes on to claim that it is in fact a lack of central clerical authority 
which has allowed radicals such as Osama Bin Laden nd al-Qaeda to offer competing 
interpretations of Islam which are often the most hostile to democracy. 
And yet, one scholar found a seeming connection between Islamist countries and lack of 
democracy.  In his cross-national study of Islam and regime type, Steven Fish found support for 
the argument that Muslim countries are democratic underachievers (2002).  He offers the 
subjugation of women as the key mechanism by which Islam inhibits democratization, although 
he acknowledges that this is due to misinterpretation of the scriptures of Islam (2002).  Daniela 
Donno and Bruce Russett take issue with Fish’s emphasis on cultural explanations for the 
democracy gap in the Middle East.  In their 2004 article, “Islam, Authoritarianism, and Female 
Empowerment: What are the Linkages?” they replicate and modify Fish’s tests and arrive at 
different findings and conclusions.  While Fish’s central point about Islamic countries being less 
democratic holds, Donno and Russett find evidence that i  is Arab Islamic countries in which this 
finding is most robust.  Indeed, a number of scholars and studies have pointed out that the non-
Arab Muslim world has actually fared quite well with regard to democratization (Stepan and 
Robertson 2003).  Zakaria has pointed out that of the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, only 
about 260 million of them live in the Middle East.  He cites Indonesia and India (more than 120 
million Muslims) as an example of how Islam can coexist with democracy (2004).  He also 
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agrees that it is clearly the Arab world with the problem: “of the twenty-two members of the 
Arab League, not one is an electoral democracy, whereas 63 percent of all the countries in the 
world are” (2004, p. 7).  Additionally, opinion polls taken in the Arab world consistently show 
popular support for participatory democracy (Tessler and Gao 2005). 
Also at issue is the nature of democracy itself.  Does democracy mean the same thing in 
different places and across varied contexts?  Is ithi torically and temporally grounded in the 
West and Euro-American experience?  Are there absolute requirements or is the concept more 
flexible?  There seems to be a normative consensus that democracy is a good form of 
government; the disagreement has been exactly what cons itutes democracy (Diamond 2002).  
For example, is secularism necessary for democracy?  It has been the path of the liberal 
democracies of the West, but this is not a given with regard to other regions.   
Is democracy an “either/or” proposition, or are there degrees of democracy?  A number 
of definitions have been offered, including Robert Dahl’s “polyarchy” (1971).  His conception of 
democracy requires free, fair and competitive elections, as well as various personal freedoms, 
institutions, and organizations needed to ensure the spirit (not just letter) of democratic 
government.  The measures used by Freedom House are essentially based on this type of 
definition (Fish 2002).  Others have proposed more minimalist standards.  Joseph Schumpeter’s 
definition requires only that the ‘principal positions of power are filled ‘through a competitive 
struggle for the people’s vote’” (1947, p. 269).  However, more and more regimes are adopting 
the trappings of democracy (regular, competitive, multiparty elections) while neglecting or 
sabotaging the substance of democracy (Diamond 2002).  This has led scholars to offer a number 
of new classification schemes for regimes which are not purely authoritarian or purely 
democratic.  It has also engendered debate about the myriad ways in which democracy might 
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manifest itself in different countries: while pluralism is considered necessary for a modern 
Islamic democracy, secularism is not.  Tessler and Gao’s survey found that while support for 
democracy is widespread in the Arab world, only about half favor secular democracy.  The other 
half prefer a system which is both democratic and gui ed by Islamic principles (2005).  
In addition to debates on the definitions of democracy, many scholars have also 
emphasized the difference between procedural, electoral democracy and true liberal democracy.  
The first depends primarily on free, fair, and competitive elections.  The second has proven more 
elusive, because it involves other aspects of society, such as rule of law, accountability, freedom 
of information and public debate, protection of minor ties, and empowerment of women, among 
others.  This difference is important to remember because most authoritarian regimes hold some 
sort of elections (Schedler 2002).  Free and fair elections are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for democracy.  The result of elections in authoritarian regimes is often strikingly 
illiberal  policies (Herb 2003).  If elections are held befor liberal society has developed, the 
prime beneficiary is often the Islamist opposition which is organizationally and operationally in 
the best position to capitalize on the opportunity (Ben-Meir 2006).  To give an example, it was 
Kuwait’s elected parliament which voted down the king’s decree giving women the right to vote 
in 2005 (and then subsequently approved it two weeks later). 
So what then is to be made of these hybrid regimes, which exhibit both authoritarian and 
democratic features?  Some scholars have offered new terms such as “electoral 
authoritarianism,” “pseudodemocracy,” and “illiberal democracy” designed to represent the wide 
variety of forms non-liberal regimes can take (Diamond 2002; Zakaria 1997).  Other analysts 
insist that “partial compliance with democratic norms does not add up to partial democracy. . .  If 
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the chain of democratic choice is broken anywhere, lections become not less democratic but 
undemocratic” (Schedler 2002, p. 41). 
Another common path in the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East is for the regime to 
permit some political liberalization to occur while thwarting attempts to increase political 
participation and democratization.  For the purposes of this discussion, keeping the two 
processes (liberalization and democratization) separate is important, for the represent two 
complementary yet distinct paths for regime manipulation or reform.  Jamil E. Jreisat, Jr. (2006) 
cites Brynen, Korany, and Noble’s definition of liberalization as involving the  
expansion of public space through the recognition and protection of civil and 
political liberties, particularly those bearing upon the ability of citizens to engage 
in free political discourse and to freely organize in pursuit of common interest 
 
 whereas democratization is the “expansion of politica  participation in such a way as to provide 
citizens with a degree of real and meaningful colletiv  control over policy” (Brynen, Korany, 
and Noble 1995).  This difference will figure prominently in the following discussions of present 
and future reforms in the Arab Middle East, because many countries are using liberalization as a 
way to manage pressures for democratization (Lucas 2004). 
 A number of different theories about how and when societies democratize exist in the 
comparative politics literature.  Each specifies certain variables, conditions, influences, and 
pathways that lead a regime to become democratic.  In the case of the Middle East, explanations 
have out of necessity focused on explaining why democracy has not occurred.  The logic is that 
if the requisite conditions or variables are absent, democratization will not occur.  Which factors 
are both necessary and sufficient, however, is a matter of great debate.  In order to explain why 
the Middle East has not democratized, as well as why authoritarianism has persisted, scholars 
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have employed a number of different democratization paradigms.  The major theories and their 
application to the countries of the Arab world are reviewed here. 
 The political change that took place across the dev loping world in the 1980s and 1990s 
has led to a large and growing body of literature.  Most theories focus on either “prerequisites” 
for democracy (necessary conditions for democratization to begin) or “transitions,” which 
highlight the strategic choices of key actors, especially the regime elites and the opposition 
(Posusney 2005).  Looking first at the transitions paradigm, for example, democracy can be 
expected to develop when regime hardliners and challengers come to see democracy as the best 
(or, least bad) option for furthering their interests (Posusney 2005).  Thus, a focus on human 
agency and the behavior of key actors provides a theory for how and when democracy emerges.  
Largely based on research into the third wave of democratization, some have also suggested that 
splits within the ruling coalitions and opposition groups may help to determine the existence and 
form of political transitions (Lust-Okar, n.d.).  Others like Juan Linz have pointed to the 
importance of leadership and its ability to create conditions favorable or unfavorable to 
democratization (1990).  Much of this ties into theories of mobilization, which emphasize the 
important role played by opposition leaders in creating and constructing the necessary vision and 
resources to force change upon reluctant elites. 
 What do these ideas about democratization tell us about why the Middle East has not 
democratized, and why authoritarianism in the region has remained so robust?  One reason why 
transitions have not occurred has been a lack of motivation on the part of Arab leaders.  The 
authoritarian regimes of the Middle East have proven remarkably resistant to pressures for 
reform.  Additionally, these regimes have been very adept at ensuring the fragmentation and 
weakness of opposition groups, who are therefore not in a strong position to challenge them 
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(Cook 2005).  Having established the institutions ad rules of the game in these authoritarian 
regimes, elites are able to manipulate the system to best serve their interests.  They regularly 
deny many important political freedoms, especially the freedom of the press and assembly.  This 
makes it all that much harder for any substantial ch llenger group to emerge and threaten the 
rulers.  In other words, when it comes to agency theories, Middle Eastern autocrats are not 
motivated to change and opposition groups are too weak and divided to pose a real threat. 
 The transitions paradigm is not without its critics.  Thomas Carothers, in an article 
entitled “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” attacks some of the assumptions of the theory; for 
example, the notion that any country moving away from dictatorship must be also moving 
toward democracy (2002).  Transition theorists tend to see democratization as a single path, and 
while a particular country may progress or regress, the paradigm assumes linear process.  
Carothers argues that transitionists also wrongly overvalue elections for their own sake, 
minimize the importance of the specific cultural and economic conditions of the country, and 
mistakenly assume that these countries are fully-functional states.  These misunderstandings, he 
claims, help explain why the transition paradigm so drastically overpredicts democratization, and 
also why so few countries have lived up to the hopes of the third wave transition scholars 
(Carothers 2002).  Indeed, Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger have argued that the poor 
fit of the transition paradigm and the Middle East is largely why Arab countries have been 
neglected from the general theoretical literature (2004).  For this reason, Frederic Volpi believes 
that any democratization (or lack thereof) in the Muslim world is “more meaningfully presented 
as a sui generis phenomenon rather than as an instance of Latin American or Eastern European 
‘third wave’ democratization” (2004, p. 1062). 
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 Other scholars have turned to modernization theory, which instead focuses on the 
necessary economic, cultural, and social conditions f r democratization to occur.  Modernization 
theory posits a link between economic development and political development: as societies 
modernize and undergo industrialization, they are more likely to become democratic (see Lipset 
1959 or Inglehart 1997).  The higher living standards resulting from modernization lead to a 
number of important changes, such as the development of a middle class, increased openness and 
participation, rising levels of education, and ultimately more accountable and representative 
government.  Richard N. Haass argues that “market-based economic modernization helps usher 
in elements of democracy—the rule of law, transparent d cision-making, the free exchange of 
ideas—which in turn sustain and accelerate economic growth” (2003, p. 146).  Whether they 
explicitly endorse all the implications of modernization theory or not, many scholars implicitly 
accept many of its premises.  For example, studies of democracy in the Middle East often look at 
variables such as per-capita and median-income, urbanization, women’s rights, 
telecommunications availability, education, and employment statistics.  All of these are 
essentially proxies for various aspects of modernization theory.   A number of studies have found 
links between some of these factors and level of political openness in a society, even in the 
normally problematic Middle East (The World Bank 2003; Hofheinz 2005; Winckler 2002; Ross 
2004; Ross 2001; Donno and Russett 2004; Fish 2002; Tessler and Gao 2005; Stepan and 
Robertson 2003). 
 Overall, however, the research on modernization theory is inconclusive.  Low levels of 
education and literacy have not blocked progress towards better participatory governance in 
Africa and South Asia (The World Bank 2003).  Alan Richards points out that India has proven 
to be a thorny exception to the development equals democracy rule, and that current levels of 
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education and urbanization in the Middle East are “certainly high enough to guarantee a vibrant 
democracy—if the critical barriers can be overcome” (2005, p. 32).  The history of Western 
democratization has shown the importance of a viable middle class in modernizing societies.  
Vickie Langhor, however, disputes the conventional wisdom that middle classes will lead to 
voter moderation and political openings.  She points out that several Arab countries have middle 
classes, and when given the opportunity they often vote for conservative Islamic parties—not 
liberal reformers (2002).  
 Perhaps the most effective critique of modernization heory is that many countries in the 
Arab World are not poor.  In fact, some of the Gulf monarchies are very wealthy.  And yet, these 
countries have not experienced the kind of liberal transformation modernization theory 
associates with rising wealth and living standards.  In response to this discrepancy, rentier theory 
has emerged to explain why rich, petroleum-based economies do not conform to the expected 
democracy and development paradigm.  Rentierism is one of the main contributions by Middle 
East scholars to the general social science literature (Anderson 2006). 
 The central idea of rentierism is that in an oil-based system, the primary function of the 
state (as opposed to in normal economies) is distributive, not extractive.  Oil rich states do not 
need to tax their populations for income; rather, they have independent, outside sources of 
revenue which they have sole discretion in spending.  A number of propositions emerge from 
this framework.  Because citizens of petro-states pay no taxes (and indeed benefit from nearly 
cradle to grave welfare in some cases) they have no grounds upon which to make demands for 
political participation.  This is essentially a “no representation without taxation” argument, and is 
expected to result in a politically inactive and quiescent population (Okruhlik 1999; Crystal 
2005).  For those who would be inclined to oppose the regime, there are many options available 
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to the state due to its oil largesse and independence.  Opposition elements may be bought off, co-
opted, or coerced into submission.  Population loyalty is likewise purchased with state jobs, 
security, free healthcare and education, and other benefits reserved for citizens (Gause 1994).  
Additionally, the nature of oil-based economies is uch that other economic interests are weak 
and have no large base of support.  The economy is dominated by the state, not economic and 
business elites.  The result of all these factors is the overwhelming security of the regime.  With 
the freedom, power, and independence oil revenue provides, the rulers of these countries have 
been able to minimize opposition and maximize the regime’s security.  Oil serves as a kind of 
lubrication when societal pressures begin to mount.   
 A number of scholars have tried to quantitatively t st the propositions of rentier theory.  
The most widely cited scholar on this topic is Michael Ross and his 2001 study “Does Oil Hinder 
Democracy?”  Ross used pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 
and 1997 to test three hypothesized mechanisms for oil impeding democracy.  The three 
mechanisms were a) rentierism, whereby low taxes and high spending reduce pressure on the 
regime to democratize, b) repression, by which governm nts spend extensively on domestic 
security to suppress dissent, and c) modernization theory, which points to the failure of the 
workforce to modernize, making them less likely to demand reform (Ross 2001).  His results 
lend support to all three mechanisms, and he argues that the interaction of the three may lead to a 
“resource trap” (2001).  His argument is not deterministic; rather, he claims that oil or other vast 
mineral wealth makes is more difficult for a country to democratize.  Some states were lucky 
enough to have established democracy before the discovery of oil, such as the United States, 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Norway.  Others have managed to make the difficult transition to 
democracy despite the oil curse, namely Indonesia and Mexico.  The situation remains, however, 
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that for the vast majority of countries, oil wealth has proven to be deleterious to both democratic 
reform and economic development (Schubert 2006). 
 In a related article, Ross also tests the effect of taxation on representation.  He finds that 
it is not higher taxes per se that cause people to d mand more representation, but rather higher 
taxes without a commensurate increase in the level of services (2004).  Weiffen argues that it is 
the confluence of oil wealth and Islamic culture which produce the most anti-democratic 
pressure.  Her quantitative analysis confirms that t e combination of oil wealth and Islam 
produces a higher anti-democratic effect than either alone or even added together.  It is the 
interaction effect between the two which makes democratization so difficult (2004).  Indra de 
Soysa argues that empirical evidence for mineral resources being a curse is quite strong, and her 
findings show that oil resources and dependency accur tely predicts lower levels of physical 
integrity rights (2005).  A number of other scholars have also found evidence to support the 
rentier argument, including Kristopher W. Ramsay (2006), Kevin K. Tsui (2005), Ricky Lam 
and Leonard Wantchekon (2002), Benjamin Smith (2006), and Leonard Wantchekon (2002). 
 Rentier theory is not without its detractors.  Michael Herb has argued that even people 
who don’t pay taxes can still be expected to want good and prudent governance, and that “the 
formula ‘No representation without taxation,’ needs a decent burial (1999, p. 259).  Gregory 
Gause III has also supported the idea that citizens of oil-wealthy regimes also want some 
accountability in their government; he also claims that these trends are increasing.  According to 
Gause, this is due to an increase (since the 1970s and 1980s) in the size and role of the central 
government, and a younger generation which is starting to take social benefits as a right of 
citizenship, not a generous gift from the regime (1994).  Gause concludes that rentier regimes 
(especially in the Gulf States) will likely face even greater pressure in the future, and the 
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depoliticization of the population (proposed by renti r theory) is unlikely to last indefinitely 
(1994). 
 Gwenn Okruhlik is also a critic of rentier theory, mainly because it seemingly ignores or 
neglects the role of human agency.  She argues that just because a country is rich in oil does not 
mean it will have a quiescent population; rather, “oil states often foster their own civil opposition 
because of the way revenues are deployed” (1999, p. 295)   She argues that “no necessary link 
exists between the accumulation of wealth and a particular social outcome” (1999, p. 295).  For 
her analysis, she attempts to integrate rentier conditi s with personalistic rule to explain the 
political outcomes of oil-rich states.  She points out that the governments of the G.C.C. 
monarchies have opposition groups, in contrast to the expectations of rentierism that they would 
not (1999).  However, for the most part these groups are weak, divided, and ineffective agents of 
opposition to the government.  She also argues that inequality in the distribution of oil wealth 
benefits both creates an opposition and provides thm with the necessary resources to oppose the 
government (1999).  What she fails to note is that e most dramatic inequality in distribution 
occurs between citizens and non-citizens (often foreigners).  Members of the non-citizen out-
group have virtually no rights or privileges, and they are often foreign laborers who are striving 
to send money back to their home country.  These people are unlikely to develop or sustain any 
real resistance to the regime.  Rather, by bestowing benefits so generously upon legitimate 
citizens, the regime may create a stronger sense of olidarity and attachment to the ruler.    
 There are still other theories about how and why democratization occurs, and why it has 
not occurred in the Arab world.  One such theory points to the weakness of civil society in the 
Middle East.  Based on the work of Alexis de Toquevill  and Robert Putnam, some scholars 
have argued that liberal democracy requires a strong and active civil society, and therefore the 
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persistence of authoritarianism can be explained by a weak or absent civil society (Lust-Okar 
n.d.; The World Bank 2003).  However, there is disagreement as to whether civil society is both 
necessary and sufficient.  For example, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that civil society is 
tremendously helpful but not enough on its own to produce democratic transition.  They claim 
that for that to occur, civil society needs to be transformed into “political society,” which they 
define as “that arena in which the polity specifically rranges itself to contest the legitimate right 
to exercise control over power and the state apparatus” (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 8).  In other 
words, while civil society may be capable of destroying a non-democratic regime, only political 
society can produce democratic transition and consolidation (1996). This transformation has 
largely not occurred in the Middle East, due in great part to the repressive policies of the state.   
In order for civil associations to play the helpful ro e they have in other transitions to democracy, 
they must find a way to engage a state-dependent middle-class and develop a stronger base of 
power capable of challenging the state (Kamrava 2005). 
 Others have claimed that perhaps civic associations in “non-democratic settings [do not] 
foster the same attitudes toward democratic governance nd social capital that they do in 
democracies” (Lust-Okar n.d.).  The logic here is that in a non-democracy, citizens fail to 
develop the necessary attitudes and trust required fo  a functioning, pluralistic democracy.  On 
the other hand, Nicola Pratt has argued that the reason why Arab societies have not democratized 
is not because civil society actors do not support democracy, but because they cannot agree on 
what democracy should look like or how to create it (Pratt 2007).  Pratt believes that civil society 
must wage a “war of position” against authoritarianism, challenging its socioeconomic, 
ideological, and institutional structures (2007, p. 189). 
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Many scholars have defined civil society so as not to include political parties (Stepan 
1988).  Langhor makes the argument that the rise of ingle-issue advocacy groups, rather than 
political parties, has impeded democratization in several liberalizing Arab regimes (2005).  In 
other words, the key secular opposition in these countries is not the politically vital party but 
rather a more politically neutral NGO.  The impotenc  of political parties in the Arab World has 
led Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid to suggest that because they stand no chance of capturing power, 
they are not functionally different from issue-orient d civil society groups (and ought to be 
treated as such) (Posusney 2005). 
 The above argument points to the difficulty of studying civil society in the Arab context.  
This lack of consensus is but one of the problems with the civil society thesis for studying 
democratic change in the Middle East, according to Sean L. Yom (2005).  He claims that any 
growth of civil society is more likely a function of autocratic strategy rather than a threat to it.  
“Arab states have leveraged a cyclical strategy of liberalization-repression to control swells of 
civic activism” and remain “robust in their will and capacity to repress” (2005, p. 1).  While he 
believes that civil society is still an important topic for study, he cautions against prescribing it as 
a cure for the autocratic ills of Arab societies.  He also points to the failure of civil society 
organizations to mobilize substantial support throughout society and to work together in 
coalitions for mutual benefit.  Finally, he draws attention to the difficulty of accounting for the 
rise of Islamist organizations and their implications for theories about (secular) civil society.  
Because Islamist parties fail to fit the traditional mold of other civil groups, many analysts ignore 
their potential.  Yom’s argument is that Arab civil society is fundamentally different and more 
complex than most scholars assume, and is therefore the civil society thesis is bound to fail if 
applied to these countries (2005, p. 8). 
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 While a great deal of resources and energy has been spent by the West, especially the US, 
on supporting civil society groups across the Middle East, the results have been uneven at best.  
According to Carothers, the international aid community has relied on a relatively standardized 
institutional checklist for promoting democracy in various countries—judicial reform, civil 
society assistance, civic education, support for political parties, and strengthening of parliament, 
to name a few (Carothers 2002).  Stephen Cook offers a critique of this limited approach.   
‘The reason that the promotion of civil society, economic development and 
sanctions have not led to political reform in the Arab world’ he argued, ‘is that 
none of them addresses the real obstacles to change in the region: flawed 
institutions’ (2005, p. 94).   
 
Whether in democracies or autocracies, a new generation of scholars (often labeled the “new 
institutionalists”) has argued for the importance of institutions in determining and conditioning 
political outcomes.  In short, institutions matter (Lust-Okar 2005).   
 Institutions include both formal organizations and i formal rules and routines that 
structure political activity.  This can mean everything from electoral rules to tribal customs in 
society.  Institutions vary across countries, and thus require careful attention to their unique role 
in each context.  In the Arab world, for example, a common way of organizing society is along 
traditional familial lines, with networks of patronage and kinship linking the government to the 
people, and the people to each other.  These specific arrangements affect and influence the way 
in which a society evolves politically.  While authoritarian regimes demonstrate less respect for 
the rule of law than democracies, they are still shaped by very real and important institutional 
features.  The nature of opposition in a given country depends largely on the rules imposed upon 
its formation and operation by the government (Lust-Okar 2005).  Whether through coercion or 
cooptation, authoritarian regimes have become quite adept at influencing the nature of opposition 
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groups as well as their relations among themselves.  This directly affects the potential for 
cooperation among opposition groups, thus also affecting their potential impact. 
 It is perhaps this ability of regimes to influence potential opposition forces which has 
helped prevent substantial democratization in the region.  It is no coincidence that autocratic 
rulers of the Middle East enjoy vastly more power than any oppositional groups.  As Ellen Lust-
Okar and Amaney Ahmad Jamal point out, “the formation of electoral institutions depends on 
the preferences and power of the actors involved, an  more powerful players can force the 
creation of institutions that suit their preference” (2002, p. 346).  Because institutions shape 
political outcomes, Arab governments can largely prevent or minimize any major threat to their 
rule.  As such, institutions are an important part of the puzzle of the absence of democracy in the 
Arab world. 
 A final theory that purports to explain the absence of democracy in the Middle East 
(specifically in the monarchic regimes) has been offered by Herb (1999).  He distinguishes 
between two types of monarchy: those in which the royal family forms a ruling institution, and 
those in which the monarch rules alone.  In the first type, which he labels “dynastic monarchy,” 
members of the ruling family control all the major offices and ministries, and have solid 
mechanisms for power distribution and dispute resolution, especially regarding succession.  In 
the second type, the monarch enjoys absolute power and independence from the royal family.  
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are examples of the former, while Iran under the Shah represents the 
latter.  Herb’s theory, backed by persuasive case studies, is that dynastic regimes are more stable 
and resilient than personalistic ones (Nonneman 2001).  He points out that no dynastic regime in 
the Middle East has been toppled by revolution, while all of the absolute monarchs have been 
ousted (Herb 1999, p. 8-9). 
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 Herb constructs a compelling case for how the specific strengths of dynastic monarchies 
have enabled them to survive and even thrive despite ris ng pressures for reform.  As he puts it, 
“the institutions of dynastic monarchism incorporate incentives that drive individual prices and 
shaykhs, in their pursuit of power, to take actions which contribute to the maintenance of family 
domination over the state” (1999, p. 45).  In other wo ds, the ruling family makes sure that every 
member has a stake in the system, so that success comes from working together to resolve 
differences internally.  Herb argues that this mechanism for managing competition and 
differences among family members is what has made these regimes so strong and able to survive 
where so many other monarchies have fallen.  A regim  which can withstand rising pressure for 
reform is one which can resist democratization.  Thus, monarchy is not an odd historical 
anachronism in the Middle East, but a key explanatory factor in its political development. 
 While many scholars acknowledge the contribution made by Herb’s theory, dynastic 
monarchism is not unproblematic.  As Gerd Nonneman poi ts out, “the case is not watertight,” 
citing the misfit of countries like Jordan and Morocc  and Herb’s dismissal of both rentier theory 
and the policy choices made by rulers (2001, p. 156).  Russell E. Lucas also notes that both 
dynastic monarchism and rentier theory fail to consider the likely beneficial effect of small 
population, with the idea that a smaller population is easier to control (2004).  Yet despite these 
criticisms, Nonneman acknowledges that “no examinatio  of Middle Eastern monarchies can 
henceforth afford to ignore Herb’s contribution” (2001, p. 156). 
All of these theories for when, why, and how countries democratize offer some key set of 
variables or conditions as more important than others.  Each of the above purports to explain 
why democratization has proceeded apace across every area of the world save the Middle East.  
This paper does not aim to resolve these disputes.  Rather, it will examine a specific subset of 
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Middle Eastern cases: the petro-monarchies of the Persian Gulf.  A short summary of each of the 
six states will provide context for the discussion t  follow.  The aim of this study is to 
demonstrate that despite their seeming conservative nd traditional nature, the monarchic 
regimes of the Persian Gulf represent the best hopefor peaceful transition to more representative 
and participatory government in the Arab World. 
 According to the preceding arguments, the possibility of democratization in the Gulf 
monarchies is dim indeed.  And yet, there are quite a few scholars who believe that if democracy 
is to take root anywhere in the Arab world, it will likely be first in the G.C.C. states.  Scholars 
have begun to take note that some of the most impressiv  reforms and political openings have, 
perhaps ironically, taken place in what many would consider the most conservative and 
anachronistic of regimes, the Gulf monarchies (Rubin 2006).  There has been a wave of 
democratic reforms and increased political participation throughout the Gulf, but most 
dramatically in Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait (Kechichian 2004).  Although the future of 
democratization in the G.C.C. remains uncertain, there are many positive signs that profound 
changes might occur.   
According to Klein et al., “this is a decade of change in the Gulf region.  Today you see 
new policies in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, but there are more to 
come” (2000, p. 11).  In sum, there are many aspect of the Gulf monarchies which make them 
uniquely well-suited for the project of democratizaon, and there is good reason to be optimistic 





The Six Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) 
Bahrain 
 The Kingdom of Bahrain is a small island situated in the Persian Gulf near Saudi Arabia.  
Bahrain has been ruled by the al Khalifa family since 1782, when it captured the island from 
Persia.  It was governed as a British protectorate un il the 1920s.  The al Khalifa are Sunni Arab 
rulers of a majority Shia country (60-70% of native Bahrainis) (Bahry 2000).  Its small 
population of 708,573 also includes 235,108 non-natio ls, mostly foreign workers who send 
their earnings back to their home countries (CIA 2007). 
Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa has been king of Bahrain since the death of his father in 1999.  
Since acceding to the throne, Sheikh Hamad has revived elections for municipal councils and 
instituted a number of reforms.  His first act was to release political prisoners, allow the return of 
exiles, and eliminate emergency laws and courts.  In 2001, he offered a new National Charter 
designed to create a constitutional monarchy with a partially elected parliament.  Voters of 
Bahrain (all men and women over age twenty) approved th  charter by a wide majority, but were 
ultimately disappointed in the pace and incompletenss of the reforms (Freedom House 2007).  
Women were voting and standing as candidates for the first time, and although no women won, 
the king appointed six to the advisory chamber.  And yet the Sheikh’s commitment to improving 
democracy in Bahrain underscores an awareness of the popular basis of monarchic authority 
(Kirby 2000).  Since then, progress toward greater openness and political participation has been 
mixed.  Formal political parties are still banned, but some other charitable and professional 
groupings are allowed.  There is still substantial d scontent among the majority Shia population, 
some of whose groups boycotted the recent elections. 
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Bahrain has the smallest petroleum reserves of any of the G.C.C. countries, so it is 
actively pursuing the diversification and privatizaon of its economy to reduce the country's 
dependence on oil.  Bahrain was the first Gulf State o develop comprehensive labor reform for 
developing the skills of its own workers.  In August of 2006, Bahrain and the US signed a free 
trade agreement, the first between the US and a Gulf state.   
Kuwait 
 Kuwait is a desert kingdom located at the north end of the Persian Gulf, roughly the size 
of New Jersey.  It has been ruled by the al Sabah family for more than 200 years (prior to 1961 
under British protection).  The current ruler, Sheik  Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah took over 
the throne in 2006.  Kuwait is the only Arab state in the Gulf with an elected legislature; the 
National Assembly also enjoys substantial independence from regime control, though it has been 
shut down by the ruling family on several occasions (Polity IV 2003).  The greatest crisis in 
Kuwaiti history occurred when Saddam Hussein’s Iraqinvaded the kingdom in August of 1990, 
whereupon the royal family was forced to flee.  Since returning to power in 1991, the al Sabah 
family has permitted increased participation in governance.  The parliament has successfully 
blocked legislation proposed by the government (most n tably suffrage for women prior to 2005) 
and forced the resignation of government ministers (F eedom House 2007). 
Kuwait is a small, wealthy nation with about 10% of the world’s proven oil reserves, with 
oil exports accounting for almost 90% of state income (Freedom House 2007).  About half of its 
2.5 million people are non-nationals (or native non-citizens) (CIA 2007). Kuwait is arguably the 
most modern and most open society in the Persian Gulf area; the government allows some open 
criticism and debate on politics, and both men and women can own property and establish 
businesses (Freedom House 2007).  According to Herb, the system in Kuwait is “not democracy, 
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but neither is it absolutism: it is akin to the constitutional monarchies of nineteenth-century 
Europe” (Herb 1999, p. 168). 
Oman 
 The modern history of Oman begins in 1970, when Qabus bin Said Al Said overthrew his 
conservative, isolationist father in a bloodless palace coup.  The Sandhurst-educated Sultan 
Qaboos launched an extensive modernization program designed to improve Oman’s 
infrastructure, educational system, government, and economy.  His reforms began to pay off by 
the 1980s, when a dramatic spike in world oil prices p rmitted the government to create the 
necessary structures of a modern state and improve the quality of life of the Omani people.  
Considering the challenges Oman faced, its progress ha  been remarkable.  J. E. Peterson notes 
that  
Oman has accomplished as much or more than its fellow Gulf monarchies, despite 
starting from scratch considerably later, having less oil income to utilize, dealing 
with a larger and more rugged geography, and resolving a bitter civil war [the 
Dhufari rebellion] along the way (2004, p. 125). 
 
 By the 1990s, this socioeconomic progress was accompanied by measures increasing 
political participation and constitutional reform.  In 1991, Sultan Qabus created the 59-seat (later 
83) Consultative Council, with appointed members giving their opinions to the king.  Then, in 
1996, he transformed the Council into an elected body, though only a small section of society 
was allowed to vote until 2003, when all male and female Omanis were granted suffrage.  Since 
then, women have won seats in both houses of the parliament.  Still, the Council has no 
legislative powers and the sultan retains absolute control over government and issues laws by 
royal decree. 
 Oman has made great strides in economic reform as well. Oil generally represents about 
75% of Oman’s revenues, though its reserves are relativ ly small and dwindling (Freedom House 
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2007).  As a result, the government has made an effort to diversify the economy, liberalize its 
business practices, and reduce its dependence on oil exp rts (Freedom House 2007).  Oman 
joined the World Trade Organization in 2000 and signed a free trade agreement with the US in 
2006.  It has also hosted US military forces for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 Despite all the great changes and improvements in Oman in the last 30 years, there are 
other problems on the horizon.  Peterson notes that Oman’s very young population largely does 
not remember the hard times before 1970, and are not as complacent as their fathers’ generation.  
Rather, they are concerned about “rising levels of unemployment, dwindling natural resources—
most significantly, water—Oman’s future after oil, and what will happen when the heirless 
Sultan Qabus passes from the scene” (Peterson 2004,p. 126).  Some have even argued that 
Sultan Qabus “may be the last of the sultans,” and that he is preparing the country to become 
some sort of republic (Kechichian 2004, p. 44).  In any case, much will depend on how Oman’s 
political system handles the uncertainty and challenges of the next few decades.  And yet, there 
is reason to be hopeful.  Joseph A. Kechichian claims that “over time, the sultan, or perhaps his 
successor, will probably emerge as the first constitutional monarch on the Arabian Peninsula” 
(2004, p. 44). 
Qatar 
 Qatar is a peninsula jutting out from Saudi Arabia into the Persian Gulf, where the al 
Thani family has ruled since 1916—although Qatar has only had its independence since 1971.  
As in Oman, the king was overthrown in a bloodless coup by his son.  Following his accession in 
1995, the new Emir, Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani, began a new program of reform and 
modernization (also similar to the case in Oman).  Unlike Oman, however, Emir Hamad is still 
relatively young (56) and likely to be in power forquite a while.  He took two important steps 
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toward greater openness when he dissolved the Ministry of Information and launched the 
satellite news network al Jazeera in 1996.  Al Jazeera has become one of the most respected Arab 
news sources, and its success has greatly increased the profile of the tiny nation around the 
world.  In fact, Qatar has attempted to act much larger than its size as a key player and broker in 
international affairs (Bahry and Marr 2005). 
 The emir has maintained that democracy is the way forward for his country (Ford 2006).  
In 1999, women were given the right to vote and stand for office; Qatar also had the Gulf’s first 
female minister.  The emir’s wife, Mozah bint Nasser al Misnad, has played an important role in 
improving conditions for Qatari women (especially education) and setting an example for 
modern Gulf women (Bahry and Marr 2005).  In 2002, the emir sponsored the creation of a draft 
constitution, later approved by 97% of voters, which widened the space for political participation 
while maintaining the al Thani’s position as absolute rulers (Owen 2000). 
 Economically, Qatar has fared rather well due to substantial oil reserves.  Oil and gas 
(some of the largest liquid natural gas (LNG) reserves in the world) together account for more 
than 70% of government revenues (CIA 2007). Though it has secure resources for at least the 
next few decades, Qatar has also worked to liberalize nd diversify its economy.  It ranks 35th in 
the world in per capita income ($ 29,800); among the six G.C.C. states, it is second only to the 
United Arab Emirates (CIA 2007)2.   Its small population also means that despite the burdens of 
financing a full welfare state, the Qatari regime also has enough excess funding to pursue other 
development projects.  One of the most notable is called Education City—a 300$ million dollar 
branch campus which attracts top quality Western universities from around the world, enabling 
Qataris to enjoy high quality education without having to go abroad (Ford 2006). 
 
                                                
2 2006 estimate 
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Saudi Arabia 
 Saudi Arabia is an oil-rich, conservative monarchy, home to two of Islam’s holiest cities, 
Mecca and Medina.  It has been ruled by the al Saud f mily with support from the al Wahhab 
clergy since 1932, when the kingdom was created.  The current king, Abdullah, officially 
ascended in 2005 when then king Fahd died; in reality, he had been de facto ruler for several 
years.  The discovery of vast oil reserves in the 1930s marked the beginning of the tremendous 
oil wealth which was to propel the traditional kingdom onto the world stage. 
 Indeed, one can hardly speak of Saudi Arabia without mentioning its vast petroleum 
wealth.  Its oil fields represent one quarter of the world’s proven reserves, and Saudi Arabia is 
the world’s largest exporter of petroleum (CIA 2007).   Though certainly not large by world 
standards, Saudi Arabia’s population of about 27 million (with 5.5 million non-nationals) is 
much larger than the other G.C.C. states (CIA 2007).   Despite its greater oil wealth, the larger 
population size and the expensive lifestyle and size of the Saudi royal family have led to an 
overall lower standard of living for most people.  Its per capita GDP, at just $13,600, is the 
lowest of all the G.C.C. kingdoms (CIA 2007).   
 Saudi society is governed by one of the most conservative schools of Sunni Islam 
(Wahhabism).  There is no freedom of the press, religion, or assembly, and women are denied 
many basic rights (most notably, driving).  Saudi Arabia has no formal constitution; it claims the 
Koran as its sole guide and Sharia as its law.  As noted by organizations such as Freedom House 
and others, the Saudi regime is highly repressive and permits no direct criticism of the al Saud 
family (Freedom House 2007). 
 The stationing of US troops in Saudi territory during and after the first Persian Gulf War 
proved to be a source of great unrest in the kingdom.  A series of reforms in the 1990s, including 
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a newly appointed Consultative Council and provincial governments, were instituted to address a 
series of petitions and memorandums from both religious and secular opposition groups.  The 
Council was later given the power to debate and stuy laws proposed by the king, as well as 
issue recommendations.  While the king may limit debat  and ignore the council’s advice, he 
rarely does so.  Usually some sort of accommodation is reached between the two sides 
(Kapiszewski 2006).  However, the power and influence of the Council should not be 
overestimated. 
 The impact of the 9/11 attacks on Saudi Arabia were profound.  Not only were 15 of the 
19 hijackers Saudi nationals, so was the mastermind, Osama bin Laden.  Many al-Qaeda 
members were also Saudi, and they were enjoying growing influence in the Kingdom 
(Kapiszewski 2006).  In response to growing internal and external pressure (as well as a series of 
terrorist attacks), King Abdullah made moves to crack down on radical Islamists in the country 
and address calls for further reform.  There was some easing of media censorship, a series of 
dialogues with high-ranking officials, and discussion of having some limited form of elections.  
The first elections in Saudi history were held in 2005 for municipal council.  Women were not 
allowed to vote and only certain men were.  Only half t e seats were open for election; the other 
half were still appointed.  Candidates had to be scr ened by regime officials and the government 
had to give final approval to the results (Freedom House 2007).  Still, the elections represented a 
significant experiment for a society with no history f representative government.  In addition, 
the government approved National Society for Human Rights became more active and outspoken 
in 2006, proposing an HIV patient bill of rights and calling for judicial reform to ensure fairer 
sentences (Human Rights Watch 2007). 
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United Arab Emirates 
 The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) is a loose federation of seven sheikdoms, each led by 
a hereditary monarch.  The seven emirs constitute the Supreme Council of Rulers, with the emirs 
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai holding the positions of presid nt and vice-president respectively, due 
to their territories’ superior wealth.  Though never a formal British colony, the U.A.E. (then 
known as the Trucial States) was protected and repres nted internationally by the United 
Kingdom until 1971.  The current president, Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, took over upon his 
father’s death in 2004. 
 Each sheikh governs his emirate by decree and with absolute power, although traditions 
such as right to petition and consultation also exist for citizen complaints.  Freedoms of speech, 
press, assembly, and religion are significantly restricted: there are no political parties and no 
fully democratic institutions.  However, in 2006 the government did approve the formation of the 
first human rights organization in the country, theEmirates Human Rights Association (Human 
Rights Watch 2007).  The legislative council can review legislation but not veto it; however, half 
its seats are elected and women are allowed to vote and run for office (one woman won a seat in 
2006). 
 The U.A.E. is a wealthy oil state and enjoys signif cant trade surpluses, largely due to its 
successful economic diversification efforts.  U.A.E. citizens enjoy the 5th highest per capita GDP 
in the world ($49,700 est.) even though only about 30% of GDP is still based on oil and gas 
output (CIA 2007).  The government has worked hard to increase jobs for Emirati citizens, 
encourage tourism, develop a modern infrastructure, and attract foreign investment (especially in 
the high tech sector).  The U.A.E. is well-known for its lavish spending on massive development 
projects like the Palm, a beach community composed entirely of man-made islands.   
 30 
 There are some problems facing the Emirates in the years ahead.  The economy relies on 
the back-breaking labor of imported foreign workers, many of whom live in deplorable 
conditions with little pay and even less rights.  Income distribution is uneven even among 
citizens, with the majority of wealthy Emiratis clustered around Dubai and Abu Dhabi (Walters, 
Kadragic and Walters 2006).  Environmental degradation and water scarcity also pose a threat to 
potential growth.  Critics have argued that its educational system does not adequately prepare its 
graduates for modern jobs.  This is partially based on a lack of demand, as many citizens can 
make a good living serving as the native silent parner for foreign businesses (required by U.A.E. 
law) (Walters, Kadragic and Walters 2006).  This hacreated a “debilitating anti-entrepreneurial 
torpor” which is not easily overcome in a population accustomed to living well without working 














Chapter 1: Advantages of the G.C.C. Governments 
 The term “constitutional monarchy” in today’s parlance is generally used to refer to a 
“democracy decorated by a monarchy” such as in England.  And yet, another definition of the 
term from the historical literature would include monarchies with constitutions and elected 
parliaments that have “not wholly usurped the monarch’s power to determine the composition of 
the ministry” (Herb 2005, p. 171).  This second definition is more relevant to the oil states of the 
Persian Gulf.  Despite their continued, seemingly anachronistic existence, little explicitly 
comparative work has been done to study the process by which absolute monarchies become 
constitutional monarchies, which in turn become fully parliamentary (Herb 2005). Part of the 
problem, according to Herb, is that most political scientists studying past transitions tend to 
“assume parliamentarism and identify democratization with the enfranchisement of the male 
working class” (2005, p. 171).  He claims that this approach has hobbled our understanding of 
the Arab constitutional monarchies, where the process has been the opposite, with voting rights 
often proceeding full control over the cabinet (2005). Among Middle Eastern scholars, there has 
been some work recently that argues that monarchism can facilitate democratization in the Arab 
context (Herb 2005).  The theory behind this work is that monarchy has certain features and 
characteristics which make it uniquely capable of handling the challenges and risks associated 
with transitions to democracy. 
 One of the main arguments for optimism is the uniqe properties of monarchism itself.  A 
number of scholars have posited that monarchies are likely to be the most successful at adapting 
and reforming without the risk of being overthrown.  The corollary to this is that because they 
face less risk in opening political space, they are more likely to do so.  A major reason for the 
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flexibility and strength of these monarchies is tied to ideology, or more specifically, the lack of 
ideology.  As Barry Rubin notes, the monarchs of the Gulf  
never achieved a form of calcified modernization asArab nationalist 
dictatorships.  The conservative monarchies proved to be more flexible than the 
ideologically set, Soviet-style mobilization states unwilling to share power with 
anyone (2006, p. 77). 
 
Rather, because their regime and right to rule are not wedded to a specific ideology, they can 
adopt selective reforms as they see fit, without challenging the basis of the system.  Essentially, 
they are free to adopt whatever policy they want, whereas Arab republics are often based on one-
party rule and nationalist populism.   
 This flexibility has contributed to regional stability, allowing Gulf regimes to ride out the 
unrest and upheavals of the greater Middle East.  A Shafeeq Ghabra points out,  
this is due to respect for social pacts, social rules and family balances.  There is an 
ability to reconcile conflict internally between one faction of a family and 
another, even in the ruling family itself.  This has contributed to a “wisdom of 
government” which has distinguished Gulf systems from many other Arab 
revolutionary “republics” (Klein et al. 2000, p.12 ). 
 
 There is a certain irony to the fact that successful reforms of the Middle East have been 
“remarkably rare and highly concentrated in the Persian Gulf monarchies; . . . [the most] 
politically reactionary of Arab states . . . have now become the most progressive” (Rubin 2006, 
p. 77).  Indeed, many scholars believe that the G.C.C. states may be in a far better position than 
other Arab regimes to contemplate the kinds of changes democratization would require (Kirby 
2000).  Specifically, “Arab monarchs have more institutional and symbolic room to improvise 
reforms than do Arab presidents, who are invariably trapped by ruling parties and their 
constituencies” (Brumberg 2002, p. 66).  By not basing their rule on “the rhetoric of revolution 
and ill-conceived economic policy” but rather agreed-upon traditions and cultural values, they 
can contemplate reform without fear of “evisceration or abolition” (Kirby 2000, p. 10).  
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Monarchies can, and often do, encourage pluralism (ta’addudiyya) whereas republics require 
uniformity to maintain their power (Lucas 2004).  
 Another reason why monarchs are more willing to use political liberalization as a 
survival strategy is that they are better able to control the outcome of increased participation.  
Many have experimented with free elections for parliaments with limited authority.  Also 
importantly, opposition in the Gulf States is largely a loyal one; they do not call foroverthrowing 
the current regime (Crystal 2005).  Rather, because these monarchs enjoy substantial legitimacy 
and for the most part rule quite benevolently, opposition forces have mostly been content to work 
with the system and within proscribed limits.  Therefo e, a monarch contemplating such an 
opening has less to fear from the opposition than a republican leader such as Egypt’s Hosni 
Mubarak.  Partial democratization in the G.C.C. is unlikely to lead to an Islamist takeover; in 
fact, parliamentary life has promoted moderation among Islamists (Herb 2003).  Rather, active 
parliaments and free elections can lay the foundation for a freer and more democratic Gulf region 
(Herb 2003).  
 One could make an argument that the reason these regimes are so willing to try limited 
experiments with democracy is because they are confident that the end result will not be 
democracy.  Fair enough.  But as Jill Crystal points out, what rulers intend and what actually 
happens may be two different things.   
Even if rulers are driven by a range of self-interested and non-democratic 
impulses, their reforms make take on a life of their own and democratic 
transitions may occur despite rulers’ best efforts to contain reform.  Indeed, in 
most cases historically, democracy happened by accident, despite the best efforts 
of authoritarian rulers to control liberalization.  Reforms raise expectations.  
There is no reason to believe the current democratic opening may not develop an 
unintended momentum in the Gulf as well with first appointed, then elected 
officials pushing for more public debate.  It is quite possible these openings can 
have a continuing cascade effect on each other (2005, p.9). 
 
 34 
Gulf monarchs enjoy substantial loyalty and legitimacy among their people.  For each of 
the G.C.C. states, historical tradition is a tangible, important source of legitimacy—their 
monarchies represent a connection to a rapidly-receding past.  This is further reinforced by royal 
benevolence in the spending of oil revenues (Kamrava 1998). This legitimacy among the 
population (especially among powerful tribes) has been the key to the stability of the region’s 
kings (Kamrava 1998). And yet, there is growing recognition by Gulf kings that they need to 
secure legitimacy in a more popularly-based, democratic manner if they are to remain in power 
(Kumaraswamy 2006). 
There has been substantial progress toward greater p rticipation and openness in the Gulf 
monarchies.  According to Owen H. Kirby, “Political change is now occurring in the 
monarchies,” and in many ways the monarchs themselve  are leading the way (2000, p. 11).  As 
Zakaria notes, “on virtually every political issue the monarchs are more liberal than the societies 
over which they reign” (2004, p. 2).  Part of this trend is due to the relative youth of some of the 
monarchs—Qatar and Bahrain have made some of the most i pressive reforms, and they are 
also ruled by the two youngest monarchs, King Hamad and Emir Hamad, respectively.  Both 
rulers were educated abroad at Sandhurst Military Academy in England, and both have only been 
in power since the 1990s (see table 1).   
Table 1  G.C.C. Monarchs, Ages, Dates of Ascension, and Education 
  Ruler Age Ascension Secondary Education 
Bahrain King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa 38 1999 Sandhurst, England 
Kuwait Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah 78 2006 Local education 
Oman Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said 67 1970 Sandhurst, England 
Qatar Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani 55 1995 Sandhurst, England 
S.A. King Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud 83 *2005 Local education 
U.A.E. President Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan 59 2004 Local education 
 *de facto ruler since 1995 
In a speech in Doha at the 7th Forum for Democracy, Development, and Free Trade, in 2007, 
Emir Hamad of Bahrain said  
 35 
I have to affirm that the region's march toward democracy, development and the 
age of free trade, even if it is slow at times, will go on and be completed because 
it is guided by man’s instinctive desire for freedom and his endeavor for progress 
and advancement. The Arab citizen will not depart from the course taken by all 
those who achieved freedom.3 
 
For his part, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa of Qatar hass id,  
 
We have simply got to reform ourselves.  We’re living in a modern age.  People 
log on to the Internet.  They watch cable TV.  You cannot isolate yourself in 
today’s world.  And our reforms are progressing well.  In a tribal country like 
Qatar, however, it could take time for everyone to accept what we’ve done.  But 
change, more change, is coming (Miles 2005, p. 75). 
 
The combination of youthful, more liberal rulers and the regional trend towards reform has lead 
some to argue that “it is not unreasonable to consider the hypothesis that recent developments 
represent a break with the past and signal the emergence of new political tendencies in the Arab 
world” (Tessler and Gao 2005, p. 93).  Still, youth is not everything, and even old dogs can learn 
new tricks.  It was after all 78 year old Emir Sabah of Kuwait who granted women the vote by 
royal decree.  All the G.C.C. monarchs have shown an impressive capacity for adapting to new 
circumstances.  In fact, Kirby argues that it is stll too early to write off the “Old Guard” in Saudi 
Arabia and the U.A.E., where reform is proceeding more slowly due to local considerations—but 
it is surely occurring (2000).  In 2003, facing pressure at home and abroad, then Crown Prince 
Abdallah invited a group of reform advocates, including Shias and women, to participate in a 
“national dialogue.” Although their demands represented a challenge to the ruler’s absolute 
power, Abdallah considered and replied to several of their concerns.  Another effect of this 
discussion was the decision to hold municipal elections (the country’s first-ever) in 2005 
(Nakash 2006).  
 An important change that has occurred in recent deca s is the extent to which 
democracy is discussed and seen as a desirable goal.  The younger generation of rulers in the 
                                                
3 http://www.diwan.gov.qa/english/the_amir/the_amir_speeche_73.htm 
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Gulf States has talked a great deal about how and when their countries might become 
democratic.  The emir of Qatar, for example, has said that his “hope is to see Qatar as a 
democracy before I leave" (El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002, p. 82).  There seems to be 
recognition, at least among some of these regimes, that a transition to a more democratic society 
is inevitable, perhaps even desirable.  The foreign minister of Qatar has said regarding reforms 
that “either you open the door or they break the door” (El-Nawaway and Iskandar 2002, p. 117).  
Many would argue that these regimes have merely adopte  the language of reform to appease 
international and domestic pressure.  And yet, whether they are sincere or not, they have 
established democracy as the model or goal for theicountries.  Indeed, across the Middle East, 
the discourse of democracy has become widespread. 
 Thanks in part to the rise of new media such as Al-Jazeera, there is active debate within 
Arab countries about democracy and pluralism.  A new paradigm has emerged in which in order 
for a ruler to be seen as legitimate internationally, he must at least pretend to favor democracy.  
In many ways, the holding of elections in the Gulf States have been the result of this need by the 
ruler for international approbation based on domestic support.  And whether these kings truly 
intend it or not, their citizens may begin to take th m seriously.  They may actually begin to 
expect and even demand that the rulers live up to their rhetoric.  This is a good sign; the more 
people talk about democracy, the less foreign a concept it will become.  Despite arguments that 
this is merely cynical lip-service designed to appease foreign governments, a case can also be 
made that even discussing democracy is granting it le itimacy.  And if democracy is an ideal 
form of government, then absolute monarchic rule is inherently flawed.  Even if these regimes do 
not mean the words they say, they may be forced to abide by them. 
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Chapter 2: Advantages of G.C.C. Societies 
 Quite apart from the inherent political features of m narchies, the six G.C.C. states have 
other unique properties related to their people and culture which may prove advantageous for 
future transitions to parliamentary democracy.  Themany commonalities shared by the people of 
the Gulf are part of the reason why it makes so much sense to treat them as a special subset of 
the larger Middle East region.  They enjoy unique demographic, financial and cultural traits that 
I will argue, make them better suited to democratization than their Arab neighbors.  In short, 
democracy, if it truly takes root in the Gulf kingdoms, will do so in quite fertile soil. 
 One important way in which the G.C.C. states are diff rent from other Arab states as well 
as other Arab monarchies is population size.  All six of these monarchies have small populations 
and relatively high per-capita incomes.  Saudi Arabia is certainly the largest, though its 
population is remarkably small (20 million) given its vast territory.  And though its per capita 
income is lower than the others, its revenues are substantially larger as well.  Overall then, these 
monarchies have been blessed with vast resources and mall populations.  In fact, the six G.C.C. 
states have the highest per-capita GDP in the entire Arab world (see table 2)—the U.A.E. is 
ranked fifth in the world, ahead of even the United States.  This is advantageous in a number of 
ways. 
Table 2  G.C.C. GDP per capita 
 GDP per capita 





Saudi Arabia $13,600 
Source: CIA 2007 
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 First, this ratio of wealth to population generally tends to reduce the risks of reform and 
make its ill effects more manageable (Policy Brief #8 2002).  Second, as Larry Diamond has 
noted, there is a striking correlation between population size and regime type, such that countries 
with smaller populations are much more likely to be li ral and democratic (Diamond 2002).  
This may be a function of the “small is pluralistic” effect, which enables the monarchies to 
embrace pluralism rather than perceive it as a threa  (Lucas 2004, p.111).  It is partly because of 
their intrinsic pluralism that monarchies, Nonneman argues, find it easier than other authoritarian 
regimes to adopt adaptive strategies (such as selectiv  liberalization) without risking overthrow 
(2001).  Also, due to their higher quality of life, these states attract a large number of foreigners, 
who comprise nearly a third of the total Gulf population (see table 3).  In Qatar this figure is 
likely as much as 80% (Dresch 2006).  This has been called “de facto multiculturalism” (Fox, 
Mourtada-Sabbah, and al-Mutawa  2006, p. 3).   
Table 3  G.C.C. Population Data for Citizens and Non-Citizens 
 Population Non-citizens Percent (%) of Population Non- Citizen 
U. A. E. 4,444,011 *2,738,000 62 
Qatar 907,229 **725,783 80 
Bahrain 708,573 235,000 33 
Kuwait 2,505,559 1,291,354 52 
Oman 3,204,897 577,293 18 
Saudi Arabia 27,601,038 5,576,076 20 
Source: CIA 2007   
* Human Rights Watch 2007   
** Estimated based on given percentage  
 
Third, a large pie divided fewer ways means that the government can use its oil money to 
subsidize a very comfortable lifestyle for its citizens, who are then less likely to be opposed to 
the regime and its policies.  By directly providing important services such as education, 
healthcare, and social welfare the state creates a citizenry both dependent upon it and loyal to it 
(Sarsar 2000).  And these services are generally only available to citizens, thus excluding huge 
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numbers of resident foreign workers, making the population functionally even smaller.  All of 
this is not to say that these countries must or necessarily will become democratic because of their 
demographic and financial positions—rather, it represents a distinct advantage for the G.C.C. 
when and if they do progress toward democracy.  
 Given the vast oil wealth and royal control over rvenues, it is unsurprising that 
corruption would be an issue for the Gulf States.  Indeed, corruption is an extremely pervasive 
phenomenon across the entire developing world, and the Middle East is no exception.  What 
might be somewhat surprising is that it is the richoil kingdoms which represent the least corrupt 
of all the Arab states. 
 
Table 4  G.C.C. Corruption Perceptions Index Score and Regional Ranking (2003-2006) 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) Score and Regional 


















U. A. E. 5.2 5 6.1 2 6.2 2 6.2 1 
Qatar 5.6 3 5.2 5 5.9 3 6 2 
Bahrain 6.1 2 5.8 3 5.8 4 5.7 3 
Kuwait 5.3 4 4.6 7 4.7 7 4.8 6 
Oman 6.3 1 6.1 1 6.3 1 5.4 4 
Saudi 
Arabia 4.5 8 3.4 8 3.4 8 3.3 8 
Source: Transparency International 2003-2006     
 
As table 4 shows, the six G.C.C. states are consistently ranked among the least corrupt in the 
Arab world.  Oman, in particular, stands out as the least corrupt Arab state for several years 
running.  Transparency International’s highly respected Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 
countries from 1.0 to 10.0, with 10.0 being the least corrupt and 1.0 being the most.  For a sense 
of perspective, consider the U.S.’s score for 2006, 7.5, which ranks 18th in the world.  The 
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U.A.E. fares only slightly worse at 31st in the world, still well above average.  The figures for 
2005 show that as in 2006, the U.A.E., Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman held the top four spots 
regionally. This means that these four countries ar all perceived as being less corrupt than, for 
example, Egypt or even South Korea.  This seems to show that a country can be rich and ruled 
by a monarch and still benefit from good governance and lower levels of corruption.  While the 
picture is less rosy for Kuwait and even more so for Saudi Arabia, they are still near the top of 
the list regionally.  Kuwait, at a respectable 6th among Arab states, trails only Jordan, and even 
Saudi Arabia at 8th is still ahead of Morocco, Algeria, Syria and Yemen.  The point to be taken 
from these statistics is that over all, the six G.C.C. states are among the least corrupt in the Arab 
world, despite having vast mineral wealth and monarchs with absolute power.  If corruption is a 
signal that a state is not functionally adequately, then the relatively low levels of corruption in 
the G.C.C. suggest that a fairly capable state appar tus is doing a better than average job of 
managing the country.  This bodes well for the future prosperity and stability of these regimes. 
 Much ink has been spilled on the relationship betwe n Islam and democracy.  
Specifically, some scholars have argued that the two are fundamentally incompatible.  In a series 
of public opinion studies conducted in the Arab world in recent years, one of the central findings 
has been the remarkably high degree of popular support for democracy (Tessler and Gao 2005).  
This support is strong in both absolute terms and relative to other regions of the world.  In fact, 
large majorities in Arab countries, including supporters of political Islam, prefer democratic a 
democratic system for their countries (Tessler and Gao 2005).  In assessing the prospects for 
democratization in Arab states, it is important to consider to what extent the public desires and 
supports such change. 
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 And to the extent that Islam influences Arab opinions, the evidence is that it is often 
supportive toward democracy.  As Abdelwahab El-Affendi points out, “Muslim communities 
have responded positively both to democracy and to most aspects of liberalism.  Limits on state 
authority, the separation of powers, and constitutionalism in general, have traditionally found 
strong support in Muslim circles” (2003, p. 36).  Diamond agrees, and notes that “the growing 
body of public opinion survey evidence shows that Muslims desire democracy pretty much to the 
same degree that people of other faiths do, particularly when we control for education and 
income” (Diamond 2004, p. 1).  Furthermore, Tessler’  surveys have shown little evidence for a 
relationship between religious attachment and support for democracy (Diamond 2004). 
 Although the vast majority of Muslims possess favor ble attitudes toward democracy, 
this is not without reservations.  Especially in the Gulf monarchies, people often take a long view 
on potential reforms.  Many believe that the best way to proceed is slowly and cautiously—the 
chaos and instability of rapid political change coner s many citizens.  Rather, the current 
attitude in the Gulf States favors slow and incremental change to minimize this risk of chaos.  
They believe that a slower process would provide an opportunity to “reduce resistance to 
democratic ideals, eventually win over skeptics, and prevent a serious backlash that could stifle 
future progress” (Ben-Meir 2006, p. 329).  In many ways, this cautious approach may make the 
reforms needed for democratization more palatable to rulers and ruled alike.  In so far as popular 
support helps in the transition to democracy, “the Arab world is ripe for change” (Tessler and 
Gao 2005, p. 93). 
 In contrast to the idea that democracy is somehow fundamentally alien or foreign to Arab 
Muslims, a more careful study of Islamic culture and history reveals traditions which are highly 
democratic.  In particular, the tradition of consultation, or shura, is frequently cited by Muslim 
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liberals as proof of Islam’s democratic nature.  The Koran explicitly recommends that the ruler 
should consult with the people, lest his rule be characterized as i tibdad, or despotism (Lewis 
2005).  Who it is he should consult varies, but it generally includes the powerful and influential 
members of society, such as clergy, landowners, and members of the elite.  While this is 
certainly not the equivalent of one man, one vote, it does point to the fact that Islam and Islamic 
tradition call for a government to be in some manner accountable to the people.   
 Bernard Lewis explains that the Islamic ideal of gvernance calls for a new leader to be 
“chosen,” which does not exactly mean “elected.”  “Rather, it refers to a small group of suitable, 
competent people choosing the ruler’s successor.  In principle, hereditary succession is rejected 
by the juristic tradition” (Lewis 2005).  Despite this, in the G.C.C. monarchies, succession is 
nearly always determined to a great extent by heredity.  But as Lewis points out,  
the element of consent is still important.  In theory, at times even in practice, the 
ruler’s power—both gaining it and maintaining it—depends on the consent of the 
ruled.  The basis of the ruler’s authority is described in the classical texts by the 
Arabic world  bay’a, a term usually translated as ‘homage,’ . . . but a more 
accurate translation would be ‘deal,’ in other words, a contract between the ruler 
and the ruled in which both have obligations (2005, p. 42). 
 
It is this interpretation of shura which allows many fundamentalists to accept the idea that Islam 
is not opposed to democracy (Filali-Ansary 2003).  The idea that Islam favors a consensual 
relationship between rulers and ruled is not a new one, but it is being used in a new way to 
promote better governance in the Islamic world. 
 In the Gulf States, the tradition of consultation s a fundamental part of the political 
bargain between the regime and the people.  In Kuwait, for example, the practice of diwaniyya—
a regular gathering of men who meet socially in each others’ homes to discuss public issues—is 
tolerated if not encouraged by the regime (Nonneman 2001).  It is this tradition of consultation 
that is in evidence in each country’s Parliament, sometimes referred to as a Majils (advisory 
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council), or even in Saudi Arabia, as Shura.  It has become an accepted principle in recent years 
that while the king is largely free of legal or constitutional checks on his power, he must (at least 
appear to) respect the opinion and will of the appointed and popularly-elected members of 
Parliament.   
 The tradition of consultation has other advantages for Gulf societies as well.  They 
frequently provide an important forum for discussion and a mechanism for popular input into the 
regime’s decision-making process.   
Where these institutions are more than window dressing, uch as in Kuwait, they 
demonstrate that the regime is accessible to the people and reduce the sense of 
political alienation created by the ruling family’s domination of politics.  Even 
where they are weak, they suggest that the ruling families are willing to go 
outside their own ranks when weighing decisions (Byman and Green 1999, p. 78). 
 
Over the last few decades, these parliaments have gen rally been expanded, and more members 
are now elected than before.  “The parliaments of the Arab monarchies are not mere facades” 
(Herb 2003, p. 189).  Still, it would incorrect to suggest that the advisory councils of the Gulf 
States represent a major check on royal power.  They are, however, growing in relevance and 
influence, albeit slowly, and if the trend continues they are likely to become increasingly 
powerful.  
 Another advantage for the Gulf States is that through formal and informal consultation 
mechanisms and forums, they are able to put themselves in closer contact with the needs and 
feelings of their citizens.   
To varying degrees, all Gulf ruling families and elites offer access to their citizens 
by holding regular, but informal meetings wherein citizens can air their 
complaints, petition for redress of grievances, or otherwise try to influence local 
and national politics. . . . By attending local gatherings and simply keeping their 
doors open, ruling families generally have access to public opinion (Byman and 
Green 1999, p. 79). 
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This serves two important purposes.  It allows the regime to anticipate public reaction to various 
policies, and also helps them monitor and address levels of opposition and discontent before they 
get out of hand. 
The local gatherings, informal talks, and weak legislatures bolster regime claims 
that they respect, and listen to, the voices of the citizenry.  Indeed, the one-to-one 
contact with the ruling families generates a sense of common identity between the 
rulers and the ruled (Byman and Green 1999, p. 79).  
 
Despite the autocratic nature of their regimes, Gulf monarchs primarily rule with strong popular 
support and loyalty.  It is imperative to their legitimacy and the political bargain they have 
established that people feel connected to country ad king.  “Alienation, both moral and political, 
is reduced by the Gulf leaders’ public identification with the zeitgeist” (Byman and Green 1999, 
p. 77).  Their relatively benevolent nature and willingness to keep channels open for their 
citizens set them apart from the Arab republican regim s of the region. 
In his comparative study of monarchies from the Middle East and Europe, Herb found 
that monarchies which made a peaceful transition to parliamentarism were overwhelmingly 
associated with free and fair elections.  In other monarchies, which failed to make the transition 
(many of whom saw their monarchs toppled), the political system was characterized by 
substantial government manipulation of elections which undermined public confidence in the 
legitimacy of the entire system (Herb 2005). What can this correlation tell us about the Persian 
Gulf monarchies? 
 If democratic values and principles are to take root in the Gulf region, they will need to 
be understood and embraced by the people.  Luckily, Gulf citizens are increasingly experiencing 
one of democracy’s most important features: relatively free and fair elections.  And though 
certain problems exist with regard to total enfranchisement, the Gulf monarchies can claim to 
have some of the most transparent and legitimate elections in the Middle East.  
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 Elections in the G.C.C. are often marred by restrictions on campaigning and organization, 
voter disenfranchisement, and problems of under-representation.  However, “the absence of 
direct government manipulation of elections in the Arab monarchies . . . offers a good deal of 
encouragement, and there can be little hope for the eventual achievement of parliamentarism if 
this tradition is not maintained” (Herb 2005, p. 187).  Whereas elections in other Arab states are 
often of questionable fairness (e.g. Egypt) or non-existent (e.g. Syria), Gulf elections, when they 
occur, tend to be seen as open and at least procedurally fair (Herb 2005). 
 Some might argue that the reason why Gulf monarchs do not interfere in elections is 
because they do not feel threatened by their own parliaments, no matter what its composition.  
This may be true.  But the inherent value in elections lies in more than simply filling seats in a 
parliament.  As Marsha Pripstein Posusney argues, holding elections  
foregrounds the principle that citizens have a right to self-selected political 
representation.  Polls that are carefully controlled by governments can still 
provide a forum for diverse segments of society to publicly debate their collective 
future, as well as new opportunities for political mobilization.  In addition, even 
legislatures with limited power often become the focus of press attention, so an 
opposition presence in parliament can provide a means for critics of the ruling 
regimes to promote their arguments via the official media (2005, p. 92). 
 
The end result of elections, even to a parliament of limited authority, is that they expand the 
arena of public debate, accustom people to democratic principles, and set a precedent for the 
legitimate basis of governance.  All of which is not to say that elections create democracy.  
Rather, than elections can help to improve the prospect  for further democratization.   
 Although some would scoff at the toothlessness of Gul parliaments, they are not merely 
facades (Herb 2005).  In fact there is quite a range, from Saudi Arabia’s entirely-appointed 
Consultative Council to Kuwait’s entirely-elected Parliament.  In many ways, Kuwait’s 
parliament has been a model for the Gulf; it is the most contentious and active of all the G.C.C. 
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councils, and it has finally given women the franchise and allowed them to run for office.  It has 
substantial power vis-à-vis the executive, exercising a strong negative constraint over the 
government and its composition. “Since 1992, the Kuwaiti parliament has used its powers to 
force ministers from office and to influence the choi e of new ministers” (Herb 2005, 176).  In 
fact, the Kuwaiti parliament did just that in March of this year, when Health Minister Sheikh 
Ahmad Abdullah al-Sabah, a member of the royal family, was forced to quit following 
accusations of mismanagement and incompetence (BBC News 3/4/2007).  The parliament has 
also forced through election reform designed to curb the government’s ability to buy votes.  As 
Herb puts it, “although there is nothing inevitable about further progress toward parliamentarism 
in Kuwait, it is perhaps here, among the Arab monarchies, where such progress would be least 
surprising” (Herb 2005, p. 189). 
Every developing country at some point finds itself grappling with how to adjust to the 
unsettling changes associated with modernization.  No other region, however, has experienced 
the kind of transformation the Gulf monarchies have undergone.  Not so long ago these states 
were economic backwaters: the discovery of oil led to the development of a modern state.  Today 
the region enjoys some of the highest standards of living in the Middle East.  Literacy rates have 
skyrocketed in a short time, and a modern infrastructure of roads, airports, cell phones and 
internet access has grown up seemingly overnight (Willoughby 2006).  And despite undergoing 
such massive change in a short amount of time, these regimes have been among the most stable 
of all the Arab States. 
The transformation from desert nomadic tribes to modern urbanites has certainly not been 
without its strains.  “The spread of new ideas, new forms of communication, urbanization, 
literacy, and other sources of change disrupted the rhythms of daily life and social hierarchies” 
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(Byman and Green 1999, pp. 22-3).  All of the Gulf monarchies tread a cautious path on issues 
of social change, trying not to offend the sensibilit es of its more traditional citizens.  Social 
issues are often bitterly contested, and have provoked bitter opposition among the population.  
When King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia announced that he was in favor of allowing women to 
drive, it was the clergy and traditionalists who forced him to abandon the idea.  And yet, if there 
is an identifiable trend among the region’s rulers and people, it is generally the opposite: a 
cautious but pronounced embrace of all the opportunities the modern world has to offer.  The 
youngest generations of the Gulf are now much more globally aware and connected than their 
parents and grandparents.  “They are already well able to decipher political realities and are 
sophisticated at spotting propaganda.  Unlike their parents, they have an internationalist outlook 
and a rights-based mentality” (Miles 2005, p. 386). 
One major aspect of this modernization has been the proliferation of information sources, 
a substantial opening to the world that has transformed many areas into cosmopolitan and 
pluralistic urban centers.  The spread of internet cafes and satellite television has made it nearly 
impossible for regimes to censor as they once did. In eed, most traditional forms of censorship 
are being gradually abandoned.  In their wake has sprung a new generation of Arab teenagers 
who are technologically savvy and “they are fast learning to expect the same opportunities has 
their Western friends, with whom they keep in touch via email and the Internet” (Miles 2005, p. 
386).  Most of the recent progress in the Middle East in the protection of certain fundamental 
freedoms has occurred in areas which have see increased information flows; in many ways, 
satellite television is a force for protecting human rights (Windsor, Gersham, and Kramer 2006). 
Setting aside the particulars of modernization theory, which has its flaws and does not 
transfer very well to rentier states, the changes occurring in the Gulf do suggest a trend toward 
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the pluralism and openness that democracy requires.  Indeed, the current generation of Arab 
youth in the Gulf States is among the most modern and free in the Arab world.  They will come 
of age with an understanding of all the variety the world has to offer, socially, politically, and 
economically.  It will likely become increasingly difficult for the monarchs of the region to 
postpone democratic reforms indefinitely.  The burgeoning youth population will be demanding 
better economic results, better governance, and better opportunities.  They will be less likely to 
see the welfare state as royal benevolence and more likely to see it as a fundamental right.  The 
regimes will have to work hard to satisfy the expectations of what will before long be an 






























Chapter 3: Domestic Pressure for Reform 
 In addition to the many positive aspects of Gulf monarchies which make them more 
hospitable to democratic reforms, there are also certain negative conditions which will affect 
their prospects for democracy.  Gone are the days when G.C.C. monarchs could depend upon an 
uneducated, uninterested, and isolated population for acquiescence to their absolute rule.  The 
rapid modernization of Gulf societies has meant that more than ever before, these regimes are 
facing increasing pressure from their people to be more accountable and more democratic.  
Rentier theory predicts that as long as the oil money keeps flowing, people will gladly sign over 
their destiny to their king.  And yet, over the last decade, despite rising oil prices, Gulf citizens 
have become increasingly assertive and discontented wi h their governments.  There is reason to 
believe that if and when democratization begins to take place in earnest, it will be because the 
Gulf people have convinced their kings that it is in their kings’ interest to open participation and 
share the burden of governance.  And the pressure thes  regimes will face is very likely to 
increase in the coming years. 
Sclerotic regimes that cannot generate jobs and hope at a faster rate than the 
population is growing cannot persist indefinitely.  And the market-oriented 
reforms necessary to unleash economic growth are unlikely to occur without 
democratic change, because unless governments have much greater political 
legitimacy, they will not have the nerve, and the autonomy from the decades-long 
accumulation of vested interests, to take bold and difficult steps.  There is a 
demographic time bomb ticking in the Middle East, and it is going to sweep away 
a lot of Western-leaning regimes sooner or later unless real reform gets going 
(Diamond 2004, p. 3). 
 
 If one of the advantages enjoyed by the Gulf States is their vast oil wealth and small 
populations, then anything which threatens that balance is cause for concern.  One possibility 
would be a downward slide in oil prices, leaving these countries with a much smaller pie to share 
among the same number of people.  This seems far less likely than a situation in which oil prices 
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remain roughly the same but the number of people increases.  Indeed, as in most of the 
developing world, the Gulf emirates have extremely high birth rates (see table 5).  The higher the 
birth rate, the less money, benefits, and jobs there will be to go around.  Another danger, 
especially acute in Saudi Arabia, is that those frustrated by the lack of jobs and low living 
standards will be more receptive to radical Islamist groups and terrorism (Fox, Sabbah, and al-
Mutawa 2006). 
Table 5  G.C.C. Populations Growth, Birth, and Death Rates 
  Pop. Growth Rate Birth Rate¹ Death Rate² 
U.A.E  3.997%  16.09  2.16 
Kuwait  3.561%  21.95  2.39 
Oman  3.234%  35.76  3.78 
Qatar  2.386%  15.56  4.82 
Saudi Arabia  2.060%  29.10  2.55 
Bahrain  1.392%  17.53  4.21 
Source: CIA 2007 (est.) 
¹  births/1,000 population 




Compare these numbers with the birth rates for other countries.  In the U.S., a modern Western 
nation, the birth rate is a mere .894%.  But even in other developing countries, the birth rates are 
lower than the G.C.C..  India, for example, is only 1.606%, whereas Egypt is only 1.721%.  
Therefore, we can expect the population of these small kingdoms to grow at a faster rate than 
even many developing countries.  It is important to note that the G.C.C. countries have some of 
the lowest death rates in the entire world—lower by far than even the Western industrialized 
nations.  The U.A.E. in particular, has the lowest death rate in the world.  Canada, for example, 
that bastion of low violence and universal healthcare, has a death rate of 7.86, and the ice-
covered country of Greenland has a rate of 7.93.  It is sufficient for now to note that the 
populations of the G.C.C. states will continue to rise fairly rapidly for the foreseeable future 
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Across the world, there are certain demographic patterns associated with developing 
societies, and others associated with developed ones.  G nerally speaking, modern Western 
nations tend to have older populations, while developing third-world countries tend to have 
younger populations.  Each has its own problems: rich Western nations must support ever larger 
numbers of retirees, straining their welfare system.  In developing countries, the problem is how 
to provide enough jobs and opportunity for the large numbers of young (especially male) 
citizens.  The six G.C.C. states all have very young populations (see table 6) and high growth 
rates, making it ever more difficult to accommodate th  need for employment and security of 
each new generation.   
Table 6  G.C.C. Population Age Distribution 
 Age Distribution (%) 
  0-15 yrs. 15-64 yrs. over 65 yrs. 
U.A.E. 20.6 78.5 0.9 
Saudi Arabia  38.2 59.4 2.4 
Qatar  23.1 72.9 4.0 
Oman  42.7 54.6 2.7 
Kuwait  26.7 70.5 2.8 
Bahrain  26.9 69.5 3.7 
Source: CIA 2007  
 
These societies are heavily weighted toward the younger age groups; in Saudi Arabia and Oman, 
children 15 and under represent roughly 40% of the entire population.  Indeed, “seventy percent 
of the people in the Gulf are under the age of 25.  Sixty percent are under the age of 21.  About 
50 percent are under the age of 15.  That says a lot about the coming of a new generation” (Klein 
et al. 2000, p. 11).  All of these children (the men, specifically) will be expecting jobs when they 
graduate.  The small numbers of those over age 65 is also telling; consider that same number in 
the U.S., which is 12.6 percent.  Given the low death r tes and fairly high life expectancy 
(ranging from 73 to 77, compared with 78 for the U.S.), it is clear that it is not that these Gulf 
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kingdoms have no older people.  Rather, they represnt a much smaller percentage of the total 
population because there are so many young people.  Th  median age of the population also 
shows the preponderance of youth in these states.  In the U.S., the median age is 36.6 years old.  
But in the six G.C.C. countries, the number is lower (s e table 7). 
Table 7  G.C.C. Population Median Age 
 Median Age 
  Total Male Female 
Oman 18.9 21.5 16.5 
Kuwait 26.0 27.9 22.4 
Bahrain 29.7 32.7 26.1 
Qatar 31.9 37.3 23.1 
UAE 30.1 32.0 24.5 
Saudi Arabia 21.4 22.9 19.6 
Source: CIA 2007  
 
And as table 8 shows, the demographics are heavily weighted towards young men: 
 
Table 8  G.C.C. Sex Ration by Age Distribution 
 Sex Ratios (male/female)   
  at birth under 15 15-64 over 65 Total 
Saudi Arabia 1.05 1.040 1.314 1.110 1.196 
U.A.E. 1.05 1.047 2.743 1.849 2.190 
Qatar 1.05 1.040 2.211 2.887 1.852 
Oman 1.05 1.041 1.419 1.260 1.238 
Kuwait 1.04 1.037 1.771 1.691 1.526 
Bahrain 1.03 1.021 1.372 1.084 1.255 
Source: CIA 2007    
 
Young men want good jobs and the ability to start and support a family.  Unemployment, 
therefore, is a substantial source of discontent.  Whereas unemployment rates are quite low in 
Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Qatar (2.2%, 2.4%, and 3.2 %, respectively), they are much higher in 
Saudi Arabia (13%), Bahrain (15%), and Oman (15%) (CIA 2007).4  “High unemployment, 
particularly among young university graduates, is considered one of the most dangerous socio-
                                                
4 Estimates are based on the following years: UAE (2001), Kuwait (2004), Qatar (2006), SA (2004), Bahrain (2005), 
Oman (2004) 
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political phenomena in any given regime, especially utocratic regimes” (Winckler 2002, p. 
635). 
In the 1990s in response to high unemployment and flling oil prices, the Gulf 
governments were forced to adopt certain privatization measures (Winckler 2002, p. 635).  The 
high unemployment rates for citizens are not due entirely to an actual shortage of jobs; rather, 
Gulf nationals prefer lucrative public sector jobs, and refuse to take lower-paid private sector 
jobs (Klein et al. 2000).  This has meant that the oil kingdoms have had to import cheap labor 
from south-east Asia to do the jobs its own citizens would not.  So long as oil revenues were high 
and populations small, Gulf governments were able to provide jobs for most of their citizens.  
This balance is threatened by the increasing size of Gulf populations.  The government cannot 
afford to give generous public sector jobs to all citizens indefinitely.  Bahrain, for example, will 
need to find jobs for 100,000 new workers in the next decade, which will be double its current 
labor force (Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and al-Mutawa 2006).  Ultimately, some of the workforce 
must be shifted to the private sector, which currently favors expatriate workers who are paid far 
less than nationals.  This withdrawal of government benefits would represent a fundamental 
change in the political bargain of “no taxation, no representation” (Winckler 2002, p. 636).  
Essentially, the current system of government subsidizing the wealth and lifestyles of nationals is 
untenable.  “The large youth populations of the Gulf expect high-paying, undemanding 
government jobs while regimes have fewer resources with which to satisfy them” (Byman and 
Green 1999, p. xiv).  And it is unclear how the Gulf States will “provide schooling, medicine, 
employment and growth in a society that is experiencing such a high rate of population growth” 
(Klein et al. 2000, p. 11). 
 54 
What will Gulf governments need to do in the future to address this demographic reality?  
Some have already begun the task of shifting nationls to the private sector.  To accomplish this, 
they have provided incentives for hiring nationals and attempted to increase the cost of foreign 
labor (through visa fees, e.g.) (Klein et al. 2000). Abdelali Jbili argues that they should also 
reduce the wage differential between public and private sectors, perhaps by extending public 
sector benefits to private sector national workers.  He also claims that the educational system in 
the G.C.C. states must be reformed to better train and prepare college graduates for the realities 
of the private sector economy.  Finally, he suggests reducing government hiring while increasing 
unemployment benefits (presumably to help cushion the transition for those affected workers) 
(Klein et al. 2000). 
In the coming decades, Gulf governments will be facd with increasing demands for 
services and employment that they cannot meet.  The rise in oil prices in recent years has bought 
the regimes some time to work out a long-term soluti n.  Reform, on the order of increased 
privatization, greater openness to foreign investment, and better regulation of the labor market, 
will become necessary (Klein et al. 2000).  As the government withdraws from its dominance of 
the economy, it will create greater space for entrepreneurship and innovation.  This economic 
opening will expose Gulf residents to global forces and influences, force them to compete in the 
world market, and ultimately result in more private initiative and new sources of wealth for the 
population.  The result of all this may well be theriving, independent middle-class which has 
historically been the basis for vibrant civic life and a force for democracy (Karatnycky 2002). 
All of this will not be without some discomfort.  Citizens of the G.C.C. states are 
accustomed to a high standard of living with minimal effort or achievement.  As Fox, Mourtada-
Sabbah, and al-Mutawa put it, 
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“Gulf nationals have variously developed quite luxurio s lifestyles while producing few 
goods exportable to other regions of the world except for petroleum products” (2006, p. 40).  
Government largesse and domination of the economy has produced a system that reinforces 
idleness and suppresses initiative (Karatnycky 2002).  A good gauge of the high quality of life 
enjoyed by Gulf citizens is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human 
Development Index (HDI).  The six G.C.C. states have the nearly the highest scores in the Arab 
world (see table 9). 
Table 9  Arab States Human Development Index Scores and Rankings (2004) 
 UNDP Human Development Index, 2004* 
  World Rank Regional Rank HDI Value HDI Level 
Kuwait 33 1 0.871 High 
Bahrain 39 2 0.859 High 
Qatar 46 3 0.844 High 
U.A.E. 49 4 0.839 High 
Oman 56 5 0.810 Medium 
Libya 64 6 0.798 Medium 
Saudi Arabia 76 7 0.777 Medium 
Lebanon 78 8 0.774 Medium 
Jordan 86 9 0.760 Medium 
Tunisia 87 10 0.760 Medium 
Iran 96 11 0.746 Medium 
Pal. Territory 100 12 0.736 Medium 
Algeria 102 13 0.728 Medium 
Syria 107 14 0.716 Medium 
Egypt 111 15 0.702 Medium 
Morocco 123 16 0.640 Medium 
Yemen 150 17 0.492 Low 
Source: UNDP 2006 (Iraq excluded due to having no HDI value) 
*2006 Report contains Human Development Index (HDI) values for 2004 
 
Thanks in large part to state-funded social services, such as education and healthcare, Gulf 
residents live higher quality lives than most of their Arab brethren.  And they have done so 
without having to exert much effort.  The challenge to Gulf regimes is to transition their 
population from dependency to productivity while maint ining political stability.  It’s a tall 
order.  While asking for sacrifices and adjustments from their citizens, these regimes may be 
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forced to offer something in return.  And such concessions may well include greater participation 
in governance and better protection of individual rights.   
 For those who subscribe to modernization theory, rising education levels are a necessary 
part of a broader social process which leads to democracy.  Education is certainly important: an 
articulate and informed public is better able to organize and communicate with each other and 
the regime, and thus better equipped to promote democratic reforms.  Education is also the key to 
job growth and economic success.  And yet, although literacy rates have risen across the Arab 
world, schools are not necessarily preparing students to succeed in the new global economy 
(Haass 2003).  In many Arab countries, schooling is predominantly rote memorization and 
reinforces certain prejudices and biases against women and minorities (Rubin 2006).   
 If education is to play its part in bringing about a better informed and more politically 
active populace, and if Arab citizens are to prosper in this new century, then the educational 
system itself must be reformed.  Some of Gulf States have made tremendous progress in 
improving the quality of learning available to their people.  Qatar has gone perhaps the farthest 
in modernizing education; the emir and his wife have made it a national priority and spent 
billions on the project.  They have worked to bring to Qatar local branches of American 
universities, including Cornell University, Virginia University, Carnegie Mellon, Texas A&M 
(among others), as well as a joint Rand Corporation-Qatari think tank (Miles 2005).  Many of 
these branches are located in Qatar’s “Education City,” a 2,500 acre development which 
integrates all levels of education and first-rate resources for researchers, creating a kind of hub 
for new knowledge.  Tuition at these elite American schools is paid for by the Qatari 
government, and having these local branches helps students avoid the need to study abroad to 
receive a high-quality education. 
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 Because it is difficult for Qatari women to study abroad on their own, the presence of 
American schools and the improvements in the local universities have made it possible for 
women to enjoy the same access to first-rate education that males receive. It is in part due to this 
benefit that women make up the majority of university tudents in Qatar, although they also 
outnumber males in Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia s well (see table 10) (Pollock 2007).  
“Literacy gaps between men and women in the Gulf States are moderate or even non-existent—a 
condition that might provide a substantial advantage for possible future democratization” (Fish 
2002, p. 34). 
Table 10  Arab States Female University Enrollment (%) (2005) 
Female University Enrollment, 2005 
Kuwait 70 %  
Qatar 68 %  
Bahrain 68 %  
Saudi Arabia 58 %  
Tunisia 57 %  
Algeria 57 %  
Lebanon 53 %  
Oman 51 %  
Jordan 50 %  
Palestinian Territories 50 %  
Morocco 45 %  
Iraq 36 %  
Yemen 26 %  
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
 
Progress is being made in the other G.C.C. States as well.  Bahrain has created a new 
polytechnic school and is working to improve the level of vocational training to prepare workers 
for the private sector.  Oman has sought to position self as the destination of choice for 
information technology study, and has launched a new IT school and IT research and business 
center.  Kuwait has partnered with UNESCO to revamp its secondary school system.  It seems 
that most of these governments appreciate the need to improve their education systems so that 
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they meet the needs of their modernizing population.  If they are able to do so, the result will be a 
better informed and educated populace able to compete in the world and potentially be a force 
for change in their countries. 
There are dangers ahead for regimes that fail to solve the education problem.  When 
students must leave their country to get a quality education, they are exposed to a wide variety of 
new influences.  And while sending students abroad m y be a short cut for a country with 
inadequate educational opportunities, there is perhaps another substantial danger.  Students who 
return from abroad “often bring back destabilizing political ideas—expectations for liberalism, 
egalitarianism, or government transparency—that can threaten regime legitimacy” (Byman and 
Green 1999, pp. 18-19).  Once exposed to a wider, freer world, many students may expect the 
same back at home—an expectation that Gulf regimes will have to confront. 
 The rentier thesis predicts that citizens of oil monarchies will be politically disengaged 
and complacent so long as the government continues to subsidize their high standard of living.  
The Gulf States, however, are not without opposition and discontent.  Even people who are 
generally supportive of their government have an interest in good governance and policy.  It is 
hard to imagine why a Gulf citizen should care any less about the quality of his or her 
government than a citizen of any other country.  To be fair, the levels of anger and frustration in 
the oil states have most likely been somewhat muted by the benefits of oil wealth.  But it would 
be a mistake to assume that the people of the Persian Gulf do not have grievances and concerns.  
There is reason to believe that addressing the discontent in their countries may prove to be a 
major challenge for the G.C.C..   
 What are the sources of discontent in the petro-monarchies?  Some are demographic, and 
include issues such as unemployment and the large numbers of foreign workers. Others are 
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economic, and are concerned with economic growth and opportunity.  Social issues continue to 
be a source of discontent, with some impatient at the slow pace of change, and others outraged at 
the dramatic changes that have transpired.  Finally,  growing number of complaints relate to 
political rights and governance.  Across the board, people are pressing their governments to be 
more transparent and inclusive.  In spite of the predictions of rentier theory, there is substantial 
dissatisfaction among Gulf citizens on a variety of topics.  For example, the 2003 Kuwaiti 
elections and the establishment of nominated legislative bodies in Saudi Arabia were both the 
direct result of pressures from below (Kumaraswamy 2006).  While this pressure may not result 
in the types of violence that would lead to a regime being overthrown, discontent may pose a 
growing threat to the stability and continued prosperity of the G.C.C. states unless the rulers can 
find a way to address their citizens’ concerns.   
 The demographic issue in particular is likely to be a troublesome one for the region.  
Even if oil prices remain high, the burgeoning youth population will strain the resources of even 
the richest states.  The youth are dependent on the gov rnment for jobs, education, healthcare, 
and prosperity.  A government which fails to meet th se expectations will face substantial 
resentment.  The younger generation no longer sees such benefits as gifts from the regime, but as 
“virtual birthrights” (Byman and Green 1999, p. 14).  The discontent arising from a reduction in 
their standard of living would be even worse if they simultaneously saw royals continuing to live 
lives of opulence and privilege, which they are extr mely likely to do (Byman and Green 1999, 
p. 15). Gulf citizens have tolerated the lavish lifestyles of their rulers as long as they were 
satisfied with their own living standards.  If the p ople’s situation is to decline (as it likely must), 
then they may prove profoundly less tolerant of the prerogatives of their monarchs.  Saudi 
Arabian royals, in particular, are notorious for their conspicuous consumption.  Most of Saudi 
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Arabia’s perhaps 20,000 royals receive a stipend raging from thousands to millions of dollars 
each month.  Royal family members are also increasingly dominant in lucrative government 
contracts and businesses—a situation that has not go e unnoticed by less well-connected and 
wealthy businessmen in the kingdom (Byman and Green 1999, p. 16). 
 Another issue which has been a source of discontent is the exclusion of Shia groups in 
several countries.  Shia unrest has been the most violent in Bahrain, where despite being a 
majority of the population (70%), they have been excluded from power and underrepresented 
politically.  In response to intense pressure, including a domestic “uprising” that lasted through 
most of the 1990s, Bahrain has undertaken a series of r forms.  When the new king ascended in 
1999, he granted amnesty to political prisoners, abolished state security courts, and allowed 
greater freedom of assembly—all of which culminated in a new National Charter approved by 
98% of Bahraini voters in 2001 (Byman and Green 1999).  In short, the King Hamad bin Isa al-
Khalifa, a younger and more progressive ruler than is father, has attempted to address the 
country’s economic and social unrest by increasing political participation.  While the reforms 
have not been without problems (such as some Shia groups boycotting elections), this strategy 
seems to be a fairly successful one.  It has a number of implications: a) when faced with 
mounting discontent, the government has responded positively by granting greater rights and 
freedoms, b) it demonstrates an unmistakable trend toward greater democracy, and c) such a 
strategy may be successful in other countries.  That the king considers such a response a good 





Chapter 4: Economic Pressures for Reform 
 The demographic challenges that the G.C.C. monarchies will face in the coming years 
make it essential that economic growth and health be maximized.  In general, oil-based 
economies suffer from a lack of privatization, diversification, foreign investment, and economic 
openness; this is true of the Gulf monarchies to greater and lesser degrees.  All of these problems 
must be addressed if Gulf economies are to be capable of sustaining their rapidly increasing 
populations.  Fortunately, some progress has already been made.  And while market economies 
are most closely associated with democracy as a regime type, the relationship is not entirely 
determinative.  Rather, certain types of economic features are more conducive to the 
opportunities and challenges presented by democratization.  “To the extent that economic 
variables make certain kinds of regime outcomes more likely, the prospects for the Gulf are 
relatively positive” (Crystal 2005, p. 6). 
 There are some who would argue that because oil prices seem likely to remain high for 
the foreseeable future, there is little motivation f r the Gulf regimes to reform economically.  
Thomas Friedman has said, “Give me $10-a-barrel oil, and I will give you political and 
economic reform from Moscow to Riyadh to Iran” (Friedman 2006, World is Flat, p. 564).  And 
in the past, it is true, lower oil prices (as in the 1990s) did seem to pressure these regimes to 
pursue at least economic, if not political reforms (Winckler 2002).  But there is some reason to 
believe that the Gulf monarchs have learned their lesson and despite the current glut of 
petroleum wealth, they have begun planning for a future without oil (Ford 2006).  The 
inescapable truth for all six of the G.C.C. monarchies is that their oil supplies will not last 
forever.  Some, like Bahrain, have essentially already run out (only an estimated 35,000 barrel 
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per day).  What’s more, future revenues are unlikely to be able to rise fast enough to keep up 
with the mounting socio-economic pressures.   
Fortunately, the monarchs of the Gulf States are aware of this eventuality and seem to be 
making attempts to develop strategies to increase investment and growth.  In order to succeed, 
these plans must include strengthening their private sectors so that so that they can provide jobs 
for the burgeoning population and tax revenues to the central governments.  And tax revenues, as 
opposed to oil revenues, will likely require greater government accountability, a good omen for 
further reform.   
 When a country bases its economy on a single source of revenue, such as oil, it generally 
fails to develop any other effective and productive sectors.  Sometimes referred to as Dutch Elm 
Disease, such a condition makes any economic system structurally weak and vulnerable to 
market fluctuations (Russell 2003).  In the Gulf kingdoms, a lack of a diversified economy has 
also meant that most jobs were either provided by the s ate or directly engaged in processing and 
exporting the oil.  But oil-related jobs are generally taken by foreigners—either because they are 
too menial for locals or because they are too sophisticated and require foreign management.  An 
unbalanced economy cannot provide the same benefits a fully diversified one can—benefits that 
will become increasingly necessary in the Gulf region. 
 In order to diversify, countries must be willing to invest in building up new industries 
(including infrastructure and worker training).  Without such a base for development, the long-
term forecast for these regimes is not promising.  Mustapha Nabli, the World Bank’s chief 
economist for the Middle East and North Africa, hasargued that part of the problem is that 
current high overall levels of economic growth have masked the instability of the system.  This 
means that their growth is essentially false, “‘Because you have an increase in public 
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expenditures which is multiplying and creating jobs but this cannot sustain itself as such’” (Ford 
2006, p. 48). 
 Some progress is already being made.  U.A.E. seems to be leading the way “among the 
sister Gulf polities in economic diversifying beyond petroleum extraction” (Fox, Mourtada-
Sabbah, and al-Mutawa 2006, p. 7).  The Emirates have successfully marketed themselves 
(particularly Abu Dhabi and Dubai) as a modern, cosm politan business center connected to the 
global network.  In Dubai, for example, “the focus has been on the Internet and media cities, 
large real estate and tourism development schemes, shopping festivals, Emirates Airline, and the 
industrial and transshipment facilities in Jebel Ali and Port Rashid.”  As Kirby puts it, “the 
emirates are leading the Gulf Arabs in the race to build a viable economic basis for the day when 
the bottom falls out of the oil industry” (2000, p. 8)   One effect of seeking to establish 
themselves as a center for business and tourism has been to create a de facto pluralism as people 
from across the world flock to the Emirates for work and play.  Other countries are beginning to 
follow their lead.  Dismantling the rentier state will take time, but it should be encouraging to 
those hoping for political reform that the process ha begun. 
 As previously noted, the private sectors in oil economies are very weak.  This is proving 
to be an increasingly important problem as Gulf regimes struggle to accommodate the needs of 
their citizens for good jobs.  Their reliance on foreign-workers is not a strategy for future 
success.  As Jbili puts it, “These countries need a healthy does of privatization” (Klein et al. 
2000, p. 6).  Government ownership is as little as 45% in the U.A.E., but up to 70% in Kuwait.  
Progress is being made, but Jbili argues that they must also broaden the scope of this reform and 
accelerate privatization initiatives (Klein et al. 2000).  The Prime Minister of Kuwait has even 
said that the country must stop hiring citizens in the public sector because it is a drain on 
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resources.  Further, most of those who work in the civil service are unnecessary (Fox, Mourtada-
Sabbah, al-Mutawa 2006). 
 The emir of Qatar has been proactive in his efforts to bring Qatar’s economy into the 
modern era.  He is said to govern less like a monarch nd more like a CEO.  He has already 
turned a number of public institutions, such as the postal service, over to the private sector (Miles 
2005).  Other G.C.C. states are making tremendous stride  as well.  The implications of greater 
private sector productivity and economic involvement for the region are encouraging.  
Privatization enables greater entrepreneurial activity and individual wealth creation—and is 
necessary for the development of an independent middle class.  And as Zakaria points out, “a 
genuinely entrepreneurial business class would be the single most important force for change in 
the Middle East, pulling along all others in its wake” (2004, p. 17).  Such a group would have 
interests independent of the state and would be able to force the regimes to be more transparent 
and inclusive.  The economic success of a country’s private sector requires that the state establish 
genuine rule of law, openness to the world and access to information (Zakaria 2004, p. 16).  
Historically, these forces have been a part of successful transitions to democratic rule. 
 In addition to diversifying their economies and promoting their private sectors, the Gulf 
monarchies will need to increase foreign investment if they are to meet the challenges of the 
future.  In many ways, they are far better positioned for this than other Arab regimes, because 
amid the chaos and violence of the Middle East theyar  virtual islands of calm and tranquility.  
The successes of Dubai and the other emirates has inspired “current attempts elsewhere in other 
Gulf Arab states to attract foreign investment by li eralizing investment regimes and establishing 
free trade zones with sophisticated communications and transportation facilities” (Kirby 2000, p. 
8).  If increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) requires anything, it is above all openness and 
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fairness.  Investors should feel confident that their interests will be protected and that their 
business can function effectively.  For a long time, investment in the Gulf region was made 
difficult by onerous laws requiring that a citizen of the kingdom be at least part-owner 
(especially in Saudi Arabia).  Now, efforts are being made to lift this requirement and streamline 
the process for investing and buying into the local m rket.  In short, the same improvements that 
would increase FDI in the Gulf monarchies would also improve the overall quality of governance 
and strengthen the rule of law. 
 A further advantage is that the more standardized th  Gulf economies the more easily 
they will be able to integrate into the global economic system.  With an eye to improving their 
situation vis-à-vis the industrialized world, all of the six Gulf monarchies have become members 
of the World Trade Organization.  And as Haass putsit, “Membership in the World Trade 
Organization promotes both economic and political liberalization” (2003, p. 147).  It certainly 
requires that signatories work to create greater transparency, stability, predictability and 
application of the rule of law in trade matters.  In addition, Bahrain has a bilateral free-trade 
agreement with the U.S., and Oman has signed one as w ll.  All of these efforts mean that Gulf 
economies are increasingly open to and involved in the larger global market.  This bodes well for 
their economic development as well as the future of their political reform efforts. 
 Weiffen argues that “if economic restructuring and/or political opening are initiated, 
modernization and related social change will surely increase political mobilization and arouse 
demands for political participation in the long run” (2004, p. 364).  The more room the state 
makes for private business and investment, and the mor it improves its standard of governance, 
the more political room will exist for newly empowered actors (such as entrepreneurs, the middle 
class, etc.).  Haass explains it well: 
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Market-based economic modernization helps usher in elements of democracy—
the rule of law, transparent decision-making, the free exchange of ideas—which 
in turn sustain and accelerate growth, though this path need not be sequential.  
When political and economic freedom work hand in had, democratization allows 
the young to voice their aspirations while reinforced economic growth gives them 























Chapter 5: External Pressure for Reform 
 The Gulf monarchies do not exist in a vacuum.  They ar  exposed to substantial pressures 
by international enemies and allies who would prefer that they at least appear more democratic, 
if not indeed become so.  As Saad Eddin Ibrahim notes, the Gulf monarchies are currently 
leading the newest cycle of liberalization, whereas the Arab republics are falling behind (Ibrahim 
2005).  This is due at least in part to growing domestic and external pressures.  It is in fact the 
convergence of domestic discontent and Western pressur  that has tipped the balance against the 
more conservative forces, giving the impetus to the indigenous supporters of reform. 
 In the case of the Gulf States, Ibrahim argues that September 11th marked a turning point 
in U.S. policy toward the region.  What emerged wasa consensus among the Western powers 
(especially the U.S.) on the need for socio-political reform.  Democracy, it was suggested, is the 
antidote to the frustrations that breed terrorism.  In Saudi Arabia, where 15 of the 9/11 hijackers 
were from, U.S. pressure led the al Saud to reduce their support for reactionary, anti-Western 
religious groups and call for greater tolerance and cceptance (Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and al-
Mutawa 2006).  The result of the increased U.S. emphasis on human rights and liberalization is 
that “talk about political reform and democracy is rife even in the Gulf monarchies where such 
issues had been taboo” (Ottaway and Carothers 2004, p. 23).  So long as the U.S. continues to 
pressure the G.C.C. rulers to move their countries clo er to a true constitutional monarchy, these 
kings will feel obligated to undertake at least some reforms in order to satisfy its ally. 
 The main idea behind the “bad neighborhood” thesis is that what happens in one country 
affects other countries nearby.  Accepting this premis , however, does not require one to adopt a 
fatalistic attitude toward the potential for democracy in the Gulf region.  Rather, there is reason 
to believe that successful reform in one G.C.C. monarchy may resonate in another, and that as 
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Zakaria puts it, “success is infectious” (2004, p. 18).  There is good reason to expect that 
advances and innovations in one state may lead to greater calls for reform in its neighbors, 
leading to a kind of reform cross-pollination.  Each country’s experiments with democratic 
institutions and laws can serve as model and inspiration for reformers across the region.   
 While the idea of cross-pollination and neighborhood influence is likely valid across a 
variety of regions, it is especially pronounced in the Gulf States.  In addition to the pressure 
coming from the U.S. and other Western governments, the Gulf monarchies also face pressure 
for reform from their neighbors.   
The Gulf States have significant influence on each other.  This is, after all, one 
cultural lake with many tribes and families stretching across borders and with 
many G.C.C. nationals (more than the governments would like to acknowledge) 
discreetly possessing multiple G.C.C. passports (Crystal 2005, p. 5).   
 
 In addition to this cultural cross-pollination, the political systems of the six Gulf 
kingdoms are remarkably similar, owing in large part to their influence on each other. 
As Michael Herb has argued, the particular form of monarchical power in the 
Gulf organized around sovereign ministries, that is, the distribution of specific 
powerful ministries guaranteed to members of the ruling family, initially 
pioneered in Kuwait and quickly adopted by all its monarchical neighbors.  
Kuwait also pioneered the use of elected bodies on a significant scale and these 
too were copied throughout the Gulf.  Kuwait’s long history of reform has 
certainly made it easier for reformers in other states to move forward.  The 
extension of suffrage to women was perhaps partly an element of that 
competition.  Qatar was unwilling to expand contestation but it could outdo 
Kuwait in expanding representation.  The extension of suffrage in Qatar, Bahrain 
and Oman was a factor putting pressure on the Kuwaiti le dership to do the same.  
Qatar might not allow as much debate over its own policies as some other states, 
but it could, through al-Jazeera, give the appearance of allowing substantial 
debate, opening the way for al-Arabiyya and other stations in the region.  Reforms 
in each state raise the bar for others (Crystal 2005, p. 5). (Italics added)   
 
 As each state tries some new reform or policy, the effects are widely observed.  And 
when some change goes well, it is more likely to be tried elsewhere.  It is no accident that the 
Gulf kingdoms have evolved similar political features.  A look at when each country established 
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its constitutions and legislative bodies gives a sense of the connectivity of the six states (see 
tables 11-14).  Equal voting rights for women show a similar trajectory, spreading from country 
to country over a rather short period of time.  And while Saudi Arabia may be a tougher case, it 
is likely that the trends in the other five states will result in increased pressure on the al Saud to 
improve their dismal record on women’s rights and expand recent experiments with limited 
municipal elections. 
Table 11  G.C.C. Date Women Given Right to Vote 






Saudi Arabia not yet 
Source: CIA 2007 
* In 2006, men and women voted in a limited 
election.  No law yet. 
 
Table 12  G.C.C. Date Constitution in Effect 
 Constitution in Effect    
Kuwait in effect since 1962 
U.A.E. interim 1971-96; permanent in effect since 1996 
Bahrain (1973-5); in effect since 2002 
Qatar in effect since 2005 
Saudi Arabia Basic Law since 1992 (royal decree) 
Oman Basic Law since 1996 (royal decree) 
 
Table 13  G.C.C. Date Legislature Established 
 Date Legislature Established 
Kuwait 1963  
U.A.E. 1971 
Bahrain (1972-5); 1992, expanded 2002 
Qatar 1972; planned expansion fall 2007 
Oman 1981, expanded 1991, 1997 





Table 14  G.C.C. Type of Legislature and Composition of Members 
 Type of Legislature Elected Appointed 
Kuwait Unicameral 50 15 
U.A.E. Unicameral 20 20 
Bahrain Bicameral 40 40 
Qatar Unicameral 30 15 
Oman Bicameral 82 48 






















Conclusion:  Prospects for Democratization 
 Rentier theory would suggest that there is little hope for democratization in the 
G.C.C. States.  So long as these states can depend u o  vast oil riches, they will face no 
overwhelming pressure to reform or democratize.  What rentier theory neglects, however, 
is the importance of human agency.  Monarchs are motivated by more than money: they 
also crave international legitimacy and respect.  These values cannot be purchased; they 
must be earned.  Further, a desire to leave a legacy of reform, stability, and prosperity 
might lead a ruler to contemplate changes not foreseen by rentier theory.  Thus, while 
rentierism is a valid theoretical concept, and does in many ways account for the poor 
democratization record of the Middle East oil states, it is not purely deterministic.  
Rather, it will vary from country to country.  Some leaders will be content to use their 
wealth to postpone democratic reforms which would challenge their power.  Others may 
be interested in leading the way to a more just and democratic society, using their oil 
wealth to ease the transition.  Therefore, while oi wealth may inhibit some normal 
pathways to democracy, it does not preclude the possibility of democratic transition. 
 The problem with most of the available theories of democratization is that they 
are based on the experiences of specific regions at specific times.  Thus, they are not 
entirely applicable to the oil monarchies.  One can accept some of their premises and 
concepts without fully embracing their predictions.  Modernization theory, for example, 
is based on sound principles.  People who are wealthi r and better educated tend to be 
more democratic.  And the pressures for change occurring in the Gulf States come in 
large part from a new generation of youth who are aware of the world and have embraced 
its interconnectedness.  But where modernization offers a clear trajectory based on 
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increasing wealth and industrial production, it is of limited usefulness in an area that does 
not fit neatly into its paradigm.  Therefore, modernization is of use in understanding 
overall trends toward “modernity” in the G.C.C., but does not necessarily offer any 
predictive insight. 
 The role of Islam in these and other Middle Eastern societies is profoundly 
important and in many ways unique.  Islam has cultural, political and religious 
implications that make it more than a personal faith.  This is not to defend the old canard 
that Islam is incompatible with democracy: it is not.  Rather, to acknowledge that religion 
in the Arab Muslim world is not necessarily the equivalent of religion in other areas of 
the world.  This means that analyses of the region must have as their basis an 
appreciation of the uniqueness of these societies.  Any attempt to apply Western-based 
theories of democratization to the Middle East must account for the unique role of Islam 
in these countries.  And yet, very few do.   
 It is easy to be cynical when talking about democratization in the Middle East.  The 
region has become a graveyard for the hopes of countless democracy promoters and activists.  
And in many states, such as Egypt, Syria, and Libya, this will likely be the case for quite some 
time.  And yet, it is in perhaps the most unlikely p aces that the seeds of future democratization 
may exist.  In a world of republics, the number of monarchies has dwindled substantially, the 
majority concentrated in the Middle East.  For too l ng policy-makers and scholars alike have 
ignored or marginalized the rentier monarchies of the G.C.C..  They are substantially different 
than other Arab countries, and even than other Arab monarchies (like Jordan and Morocco) due 
to their oil wealth and close common ancestry and culture.  For a long time, the rest of the Arab 
world had looked down on the G.C.C. states for being overly traditional, backward—certainly 
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not cosmopolitan or sophisticated like Cairo or Beirut.  But in recent decades, something has 
fundamentally shifted in the Gulf States and within the Arab region.  Suddenly these 
conservative, traditional regimes have become dynamic, progressive and focused on the future.  
And the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf are doing all of this on their own terms. 
 To be fair, the states of the G.C.C. are not created equal.  In many ways, Kuwait far 
outstrips the others when it comes to parliamentary strength, freedom and political rights.  
Bringing up the rear are Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E, whose experiments with reform have been 
extremely limited.  On the score of economic reform, however, the U.A.E. leads the pack—
blazing a trail toward global economic integration and influence that is a model for other Gulf 
States.  In short, each state is finding its own way at its own pace.  But make no mistake, change 
is occurring—albeit slowly and sometimes imperceptibly.  As Kirby notes,  
In all the monarchic states, a debate on difficult issues is occurring; movement, 
however incremental, is taking place.  This is proof f the capacity of the 
monarchic system to change and an indication of the monarchies’ confidence and 
their ability to see how their own interests are interwoven with those of the state.  
The debate is occurring to some degree in every Middle Eastern monarchy . . . 
(2000, p. 10). 
 
And as Tessler and Gao put it, “it is possible to have a meaningful discussion about whether the 
glass is half full or half empty in some of these countries” (2005, p. 84).  
 As the kings of the petro-monarchies confront the new century, they face a time of 
increasing change and modernization.  There are mounting pressures on a number of fronts 
which will make further maintenance of the status qo impossible.  Each monarchy faces a stark 
demographic fact: Gulf population growth rates are ov rwhelming economic growth rates.  The 
entire rentier system depends upon the state providing jobs and good lives for its citizens.  And 
yet, due to high birth rates and the increasing expectations of the youth, these states are in a 
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fundamentally untenable position.  Something has got to give.  The stability of their rule has 
rested in large part on public complacency and traditional sources of legitimacy.  But as the 
bargain between ruler and ruled breaks down, a new modus vivendi must be found.  This pressure 
will most likely lead the regime to offer more political participation and freedom in exchange its 
continued rule.   
 In addition to the rising pressures of their peopl’s expectations, the Gulf monarchs also 
bear in mind that the only way forward for them economically is to develop a sustainable system.  
This means they must work towards greater diversificat on, privatization, and make their 
economies attractive to investors.  In short, they must join the global rules-based economy and 
conform to international standards.  This means givin  greater power and freedom to native 
entrepreneurs, loosening tax and investment regulations, streamlining business procedures, and 
encouraging individual effort and wealth creation.  I  many ways, these reforms are easier and 
less threatening than the needed political reforms, and regimes are likely to pursue these first.  
The likely effect, intended or not, will be the creation some sort of independent business class.  
The more people who have interests separate from the state, the greater the accountability they 
will demand.  In the end, the reforms that produce better economic results also favor greater 
political openness and participation.  “The places that offer the best prospects for democracy are 
those where there is a process of gradual change in th  direction of freer institutions.  Democracy 
usually evolves out of a movement toward freedom” (Lewis 2003, p. 219). 
 The countries of the G.C.C. will face more than just domestic pressure in the coming 
years.  The United States and the West are increasingly pushing for at least the appearance of 
greater democracy.  And while this may not produce substantive reforms, it does at least prevent 
some of the more egregious forms of repression and co trol.  More important, perhaps, than even 
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U.S. influence is that of the neighborhood.  Gulf States and peoples are remarkably 
interconnected, and each is aware of what is occurring elsewhere.  Reform in one country 
(especially if it succeeds) creates pressure for rem in all the others.  This means that even the 
more recalcitrant regimes cannot postpone reform indef itely. 
 The good news for the Gulf monarchies is that unlike their Arab neighbors, they have a 
number of advantages that make democratic reform less d stabilizing and more likely to succeed.  
Whereas in some Arab republics, rulers face substantial resistance at every turn by radical 
Islamists—Gulf Islamists are generally more moderate and content to work within the system 
and with the monarch.   Rather than being the only pposition, they are only one group among 
many.  Therefore, a monarch essentially can implement top-down reforms as needed without too 
great concern.  Monarchs can adopt virtually any position without worrying about betraying a 
founding ideology, and can co-opt opposition platforms if necessary.  Further, they have small, 
well-educated populations who will likely support gadual reforms and greater openness.  And 
they will increasingly expect a say in how their country is governed, even if this doesn’t include 
overthrowing the monarchy.  In his survey of democracy throughout the world, Kechichian has 
found that  
     Ordinary Gulf citizens were routinely verbalizing some of their anxieties, 
insisting on the need for openness, both on internal matters as well as key foreign-
policy issues. 
     ‘Democracy’ is developing throughout the area, and while some G.C.C. ruling 
families have faced the will of their electorates, progress if painfully slow.  Still, 
there is every reason to believe that the process itself will continue to empower 
G.C.C. citizens to gradually assume a greater share of the burden of governance 
(2004, p. 53). 
 
 Despite these advantages and pressures, change will not occur overnight.  These are still 
in many ways traditional societies that cherish stabili y and prosperity.  Neither Gulf citizens nor 
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Gulf monarchs want to see great unrest or instabiliy in the name of democratization.  When 
asked, people in the region say they want “slow and incremental change to reduce resistance to 
democratic ideals, eventually win over skeptics, and prevent a serious backlash that could stifle 
future progress” (Ben-Meir 2006, p. 329).  Rather than bemoan the slow pace of change in the 
region, analysts and scholars would do better to look at what is happening and why.  While 
proceeding slowly may seem to serve the interests of the absolute monarch, it may also serve the 
cause of long-term democratization.  Rather than focusing on how democratization has 
proceeded in other regions of the world, the scholarly community would do well to pay attention 
to the unique (and possibly new-paradigm-creating) trajectory and progress occurring in the Gulf 
States.  Here, in the Persian Gulf region,  
The evolution of greater power and responsibility of representative institutions is 
a distinct possibility.  Middle Eastern monarchies will not follow the same path 
toward constitutional monarchy as did their European neighbors.  However, if 
representative institutions win political battles in shaping policies, over time 
inertia for their greater power may emerge. . . . The future of democratization in 
most Middle Eastern monarchies lies not in spectacular regime collapses or social 
revolutions.  Rather, budget debates, confidence vot s of cabinets, and the 
questioning of ministers are the likely paths toward the evolution of greater 
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